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Torn Between Two Selves: Should Law Care




Based upon psychological research and neuroscience studies about sub-
jective well-being, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics Daniel Kahneman
poses a riddle about which of these two selves should count: experiencing
selves or remembering selves. Our remembered emotions (memories) are
usually rosier than our experienced emotions, and people are motivated by
their predicted emotions, which tend to coincide with their emotional memo-
ries. This Article advocates that law should care more about experiencing
selves than remembering selves if and when experiences result in chronic
health or stress consequences that either (1) societies care about more than
people do (because of externalities, public bads, or public goods); or (2) peo-
ple also care about, but are unaware of, do not remember, or are unable to act
upon (due to self-control problems). This article analyzes examples of
chronic health or stress effects from such experiences as dense and long com-
mutes, unhealthy eating, regular physical exercise, sedentary behavior, and
financial/retirement planning.
There is a video I found from back when I was three
You set up a paint set in the kitchen
And you're talking to me
It's the age of princesses and pirate ships
And the seven dwarfs
Daddy's smart
And you're the prettiest lady in the whole wide world
Now I know why all the trees change in the fall
I know you were on my side
Even when I was wrong
And I love you for giving me your eyes
Staying back and watching me shine
And I didn't know if you knew
So I'm taking this chance to say
That I had the best day with you today.'
Professor and DeMuth Chair of Business Law, University of Colorado Law
School. J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D., Harvard University; A.B., Princeton
University.
1. TAYLOR SwiFt, The Best Days, on FEARLESS (Big Machine Records 2008).
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INTRODUCTION
Father Guido Sarducci, a famous fictional character created and played
by Saturday Night Live original cast member comedian Don Novello during
the 1970s and 1980s, proposesCin a very entertaining monologueCto start a
new university that would teach in only five minutes the information that
average students remember five years after leaving college.2 For example, he
jokes that his Five Minute University Spanish teaches only ",C6mo estA
usted?" which means "How are you?" and "muy bien" which means "very
well," because that is pretty much all that most students remember five years
after taking four semesters of college Spanish.3 He concludes by saying: "I'm
not sure, but I'm pretty sure, right next door to the Five Minute University, I
might open up a little law school. You got another minute?"4
His central point is that most college students remember only very little
of the vast amount of material they study in four years of college. Of course,
this fundamental insight applies not only to college students, but also to eve-
ryone more generally. None of us remembers every single moment in our
lives, and of those moments that we do remember, not all of them are
remembered with equal clarity or emphasis. Naturally, our memories are fal-
lible and imperfect. But such an observation compares human memories to
records of a computer or some other infallible and perfect recording device
left operating all the time. Such a comparison misconstrues human memory
as having a goal of perfect recall. Psychologist William James pointed out,
"[s]election is the very keel on which our mental ship is built. And in this
case of memory, its utility is obvious. If we remembered everything, we
should on most occasions be as ill off as if we remembered nothing."5 In-
stead, we remember to help us derive meaning from and make sense of all
those moments in our lives. People only remember that which is personally
meaningful,6 and what is meaningful to people often changes during their
lifetimes in light of subsequent events.
An influential expert on human memory and law, psychologist Eliza-
beth Loftus points out that people's memories are not only constructed,
2. See GILDA LIVE (Warner Bros. 1980), transcript available at http://www.tem-
plaruniversity.com/guido.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 680 (1890).
6. See Robert I. Sutton, Feelings About a Disneyland Visit: Photography and the
Reconstruction of Bygone Emotions, 1 J. MGMT INQUIRY 278 (1992) (sug-
gesting that a key component of people's memories of events comes from pho-
tographs taken of happy moments).
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rather than played back like a video recording,7 but also can be influenced by
suggestive language and images.8 Elizabeth Loftus memorably states:
Memory. It's a paradox. Memory is the bedrock of who we are.
Without memory, life would not have the sense of continuity that
it does. It would consist only of momentary experiences that don't
relate to each other. Without memory we could not remember
what we want to say. Nor would we have the sense of continuity
to know who we are.9
Psychologist, subjective well-being research pioneer, and 2002 Nobel
Laureate in Economics,10 Daniel Kahneman, poses a riddle which of these
two selves should count: experiencing selves or remembering selves.tI Noted
philosopher of emotions Ronald de Sousa states:
[W]hat are we to say about the prospect that present experience
will get reassessed by future judgment? Conversely, why should I
trust a present judgment about the past that doesn't match the as-
sessment I made at the time? Which matters more? Is it what I
experience right now, or is it what I will experience in retrospect,
as I judge this moment in the calm contemplation of what my life
was like? I have no answer, nor any principle for generating one.
That lacuna, indeed, can be taken as the main message of this
book. 12
This article proposes that the law should care more about people's ex-
periences than memories in at least one pair of general circumstances: first, if
society cares more about certain aspects or consequences of experiences than
individuals do; and second, if people do not remember or are unaware of, but
care about, negative aspects or consequences of experiences.
7. See generally ELIZABETH Lovrus, MEMORY: SURPRISING NEW INSIGHTS INTO
How WE REMEMBER AND WHY WE FORGET (1980).
8. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind A 30-
Year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY
361, 363 (2005).
9. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Crimes of Memory: False Memories and Societal Justice,
in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE REAL WORLD 83, 83 (Morton Ann Gemsbacher et al.
eds., 2011).
10. Daniel Kahneman-Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2014) [hereinafter Kahneman on NOBEL PRIZE].
11. Daniel Kahneman, The Riddle of Experience vs. Memory, TED (Feb. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.ted.com/talks/daniel-kahneman the riddle-of-experi
encevsmemory; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377-410,
381 (2011) [hereinafter Kahneman, Experience vs. Memory].
12. RONALD DE SOUSA, EMOTIONAL TRUTH 244 (2011).
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People's experiences include, but are not limited to, experienced affect.
There are multiple dimensions of experiences including experienced affect,
biological consequences or health measures of experiences, and spillover ef-
fects of individual experiences upon others.13 This multiplicity of aspects of
experiences naturally suggests a decomposition or taxonomy of conse-
quences of experiences into at least experienced affect, experienced biologi-
cal, health, or stress consequences, and remembered affect. In fact,
doctors and physicians are learning that stress is more than an
emotional problem, deeper than a fleeting mental encumbrance.
Our brains constantly rewire themselves throughout our lives, and
are strongly driven by experiences, both positive and negative.
And it seems that in certain situations, stress is an antagonist that
can indeed leave an indelible mark on our brains.14
Experiences can produce negative experienced affect and negative bio-
logical, health, or stress consequences, but nonetheless be generally forgotten
or produce only mildly negative or even neutral remembered affect. Exam-
ples of such experiences are long and dense urban commutes. Experiences
can also produce negative experienced affect and negative biological, health,
or stress consequences but produce dampened remembered negative affect.
Examples of such experiences possibly include long and dense commutes.
Experiences can even produce positive experienced affect but negative bio-
logical or health consequences and positive remembered affect. Examples of
such experiences possibly include unhealthy (over)eating and certain types of
addictive or obsessive behavior.
People choose experiences based upon their predicted affect, which
often coincides with remembered affect rather than experienced affect. The
fact that the valence of remembered affect can differ from that of not only
experienced affect, but also biological, health, or stress consequences, im-
plies that people may engage in activities that have adverse effects on their
health, such as undergoing long and dense commutes and eating unhealthily.
13. See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, International Happiness
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16668, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16668 (conjecturing that there is likely to be a
slow convergence between the growing social science research literature about
happiness, mental well-being, and subjective well-being with a related biologi-
cal, epidemiological, and medical research literature about biomarkers, health,
and physical well-being).
14. Brian Mossop, Neurostress: How Stress May Fuel Neurodegenerative Dis-
eases, Sci. AM. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?
id=neurostress-how-stress-ma; see also Debra S. Austin, Killing Them Softly:
Neuroscience Reveals How Brain Cells Die from Law School Stress and How
Neural Self-Hacking Can Optimize Cognitive Performance, 59 Loy. L. REV.
791, 816-22 (2013) (describing the relationship between the brain and the body
in response to stress).
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Individuals may indeed care about suffering from adverse biological or nega-
tive health consequences of certain experiences, but are unaware of those
consequences as they happen, underestimate cumulative and/or probabilistic
effects, or not care about negative externalities or public bad aspects of their
experiences. In contrast, societies may care about individual health conse-
quences or social effects more than individuals do. Possible legal interven-
tions include emphasizing public attention on adverse biological or negative
health consequences of experiences, such as being sedentary and repeatedly
undergoing dense and long commutes. Or conversely, legal interventions
could also include focusing public attention on positive biological or health
consequences from experiences such as healthy eating and regular physical
exercise. This refocusing of attention is akin to directing an anxious airline
passenger's awareness to a still cup of water to see lack of turbulence on a
plane.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes happiness research5
and neuroscience studies about experienced affect versus remembered (and
predicted) affect to conclude that most people's experienced affect systemati-
cally differs from remembered affect (which tends to coincide with predicted
affect). Part II advocates that law should care more about experiencing selves
than remembering selves if and when experiences are repeated with adverse
cumulative, delayed, and long-term objective health or stress consequences,
as is true of long dense commutes. Part II also briefly surveys other contexts
and situations in which the law should care more about health and stress
consequences of lived experiences than recalled memories, including over-
eating or unhealthy eating, physical exercise, and retirement/financial
planning.
II. EXPERIENCING SELVES VERSUS REMEMBERING SELVES
"Forget about it. You'll have a thousand pasts and no future."16
A very brief video with only music and written text very effectively and
movingly portrays how experiences and memories of happiness often di-
verge, and how alternative temporal perspectives can be crucial to achieving
happiness.17 Related themes often play important roles in movies, television
programs, and literature. For example, how our past and present selves are
related, how memories filter our past, and how persistent memories can dam-
15. See generally Peter H. Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 405 (2010) (analyzing legal policy implications of happi-
ness research); see also Peter H. Huang, Happiness in Business or Law, 12
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 153 (2011) (providing a brief introduction to
recent happiness research and its applications to business or law).
16. EL SECRETO DE SUS Ojos (THE SECRET IN THEIR EYES) (Sony Pictures Classics
2009).
17. Gretchen Rubin, The Years Are Short, http://www.theyearsareshort.com/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014).
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age efforts to live presently are central and recurring themes in the film that
received the 2010 Best Foreign Language Film Oscar,18 El Secreto de Sus
Ojos (The Secret in Their Eyes). 19 In another movie, The Best of Tim es,20
comedian Robin Williams plays a banker who is obsessed with the one mo-
ment in his life that he is most ashamed of, namely when he dropped a per-
fectly thrown football pass in the final seconds of a high school game thirteen
years earlier. In another film entitled Old School,21 three thirty-something-
year-old men seek to recapture the outrageous, irrepressible fun they had at
college. Reality television programs do not show raw, unedited 24/7 footage
of contestants' actual experiences, but instead present edited, selected epi-
sodes that involve peak emotions and/or meaningful, memorable moments of
contestants' experienced lives. Similarly, fictional television shows present
selected moments of characters' lives in meaningful story arcs. Finally, fic-
tional and non-fictional works of literature do not recount every moment of
their characters' experiences, but instead only describe particular moments
that hold meaning.
Before analyzing research about experiences versus memories from
happiness studies and neuroscience, it helps to emphasize that even though
sometimes objective outcomes and subjective experiences may diverge in
response to various events and circumstances in people's lives, very often
objective outcomes and subjective experiences also coincide. Not surpris-
ingly, economics and law traditionally focus on objective outcomes that are
measurable, observable, and verifiable rather than subjective experiences that
some regard as immeasurable, unobservable, and unverifiable. A commonly
held view is that subjective experience is a first-person phenomenon, so that
other people have to filter and interpret both contemporaneous and
remembered self-reports about subjective experience.
But, an extensive recent set of literature in such fields as economics,
epidemiology, neuroscience, psychology, and sociology contend that subjec-
tive experiences can be reliably measured, observed, and verified. Undoubt-
edly, part of the skepticism regarding experiences is due to an uneasy
relationship with, and skepticism toward, a core aspect of subjective exper-
iences-namely emotions-by many attomeys, 22 legal educators,23 and legal
18. Nominees & Winners for the 82nd Academy Awards, OSCARS, http://awards
database.oscars.org/ampasawards/DisplayMain.jsp?curTime= 1413038804155
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
19. EL SECRETO DE SUS Ojos, supra note 16.
20. THE BEST OF TIMES (Universal Studios 1986).
21. OLD SCHOOL (DreamWorks SKG 2003).
22. See generally Helaine & Dwight Golann, Why Is It Hard for Lawyers to Deal
with Emotional Issues? A Dialogue Between a Lawyer-Mediator and a Thera-
pist, 9 No. 2 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 26, 26-29 (2003) (condensing discussions
between a husband and wife concerning lawyers' uneasiness in dealing with
emotions).
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scholars.24 Two traditional arguments to justify not incorporating emotions
into legal analysis, practice, and scholarship are that emotions can distort
judgments25 and could be feigned.26 Of course much of life can distort judg-
ments; not only emotions, but also beliefs, thoughts, and testimony could be
feigned. To be sure, certain emotions are already accepted in some particular
areas of law, such as criminal law27 (compassion, hate, mercy, passion, re-
venge, sympathy, vengeance), family law28 (envy, love, hate, jealousy), and
negotiations.29 But, a more general acceptance of how central emotions-in
addition to such non-emotional aspects of experiences as meaning3o and self-
23. See, e.g., Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational
Experience of First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 467-519
(2010) (criticizing legal education's neglect of emotions and providing exam-
ples of including emotional components to a torts class); Joshua D. Rosenberg,
Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Inpor-
tance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1225, 1229-35, 1258-61, 1277 (2004) (criticizing the overemphasis of legal
education on logic and reason in addition to explaining the importance of emo-
tions to legal practice and therefore legal education).
24. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2013-33 (2010) (examining ambivalent responses to
scholarship about emotions in law).
25. Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 800 (1990)
(arguing indeterminacy of emotional judging due to multiplicity of emotions
and objects upon which emotions focus); Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus
Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309, 309, 311, 327 (Susan A.
Bandes ed., 1999) (expressing concern over distorting effects of emotionalism
and emotions).
26. Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 107, 111 (2001) (expressing concern that instructing judges and
jurors to pay attention to emotions could induce defendants to strategically dis-
play counterfeit remorse during sentencing process); Austin Sarat, Remorse,
Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 168, 169 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (expressing
skepticism about abilities of legal decision makers to differentiate between
feigned and genuine remorse).
27. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology
into Family Law, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 385 (2009).
29. See, e.g., Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist:
What We Know and Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Nego-
tiation, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 1 (2002).
30. But see Carroll E. Izard, Don't Pursue Happiness-Find and Follow What In-
terests You, 25 EMOTION RESEARCHER 5, 5-6 (discussing importance of mean-
ing to happiness).
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identity-are to people's lives is bound to have profound implications for
law,31 just as it does in the private sector for product design32 and building
architecture.33 Marketing professor Peter Boatwright and professor of
mechanical engineering, design, and computer science Jonathan Cagan offer
numerous case studies and examples of products and services that captivate
people because they provide authentic, emotionally fulfilling, and memorable
experiences,34 such as Amazon.com,35 BMW sports cars,36 Facebook,37
Google and Google Maps,38 Harley-Davidson motorcycles,39 iPhones,40
Nordstrom's customer service,h1 Webkinz stuffed animals,42 and YouTube
videos.43 Boatwright and Cagan utilize industry-based research and empirical
data to demonstrate that emotionally rich product experiences (and memo-
ries) are correlated with greater word-of-mouth buzz,44 increased brand loy-
alty,45 more profitability,46 and higher stock prices.47
31. See, e.g., Hila Keren, Considering Affective Consideration, 40 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 165 (2010) (analyzing emotions playing leading roles in gift prom-
ising, namely empathy and gratitude, to challenge reflexive unenforceability of
gratuitous promises under traditional contract law).
32. See generally DONALD A. NORMAN, EMOTIONAL DESIGN: WHY WE LOVE (OR
HATE) EVERYDAY THINGS (2005).
33. Id. at 109.
34. See generally PETER BOATWRIGHT & JONATHAN CAGAN, BUILT TO LOVE: CRE-
ATING PRODUCTS THAT CAPTIVATE CONSUMERS (2010); see also BUILT TO
LOVE, http://www.builttolove.com/ (accompanying website) (last visited Nov.
15, 2014).
35. BOATWRIGHT & CAGAN, supra note 34, at 17.
36. Id. at 18, 45, 77.
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 18, 100-04.
40. Id. at 13, 22.
41. BOATWRIGHT & CAGAN, supra note 34, at 72-73.
42. Id. at 15-17; see also WEBKINZ, http://www.webkinz.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
43. BOATWRIGHT & CAGAN, supra note 34, at 17.
44. Id. at 19-20.
45. Id. at 21-22, 61.
46. Id. at 25-32.
47. Id. at 33-42.
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A. Objective Outcomes Often Track Subjective Experiences
Law professor Adam Kolber emphasizes how emotions, feelings, and
other subjective experiences are fundamentally crucial to law, despite their
being indirectly observable and hard to verify.48 He believes that law down-
plays or ignores the importance of subjective experiences because subjective
experiences are not directly observable.49 A central point of this article is that
objective outcomes are often correlated with subjective experiences. This is
true in the case of directly-observed social behaviors, acquaintance ratings,
clinician judgments, self-reported eudaimonic or psychological well-being
(focusing on positive psychological functioning and human development),
and self-reported hedonic or subjective well-being (focusing on happiness,
presence of positive affect, life satisfaction, and low negative affect).50 Phi-
losopher Laura Sizer proposes that an affect theory of happiness can recon-
cile both objective and subjective aspects of happiness.51 A state-by-state
analysis of the United States indicates a correlation between such objective
outcomes as education and wealth and subjective experiences measured by
self-reported subjective well-being.52 Economists Andrew Oswald and Ste-
phen Wu demonstrate that for all fifty American states and the District of
Columbia, estimating quality of life based upon a number of quantifiable
objective outcomes matches closely with average self-reported happiness
measures of subjective experiences.53 Self-reported measures of subjective
life satisfaction from longitudinal panel survey data in Hungary and Russia
robustly predict a set of objective outcomes about people's well-being,
namely observed household expenditures on various categories of consump-
tion.54 Length of daylight duration from dawn to dusk, which correlates with
48. See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY
L.J. 585 (2011).
49. See id.
50. Christopher S. Nave et al., Beyond Self-Report in the Study of Hedonic and
Eudaimonic Well-Being: Correlations with Acquaintance Reports, Clinician
Judgments and Directly Observed Social Behavior, 42 J. RES. PERSONALITY
643, 645-57 (2008) (presenting details of these correlations); see also John F.
Tomer, Enduring Happiness: Integrating the Hedonic and Eudaimonic Ap-
proaches, 40 J. Soclo-ECON. 530 (2011).
51. See generally Laura Sizer, Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happi-
ness, 80 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 133, 133-59 (2010).
52. Peter J. Rentfrow et al., Happy States of America: A State-Level Analysis of
Psychological, Economic, and Social Well-Being, 43 J. RES. PERSONALITY
1073 (2009).
53. See Andrew J. Oswald & Stephen Wu, Objective Confirmation of Subjective
Measures of Human Well-Being: Evidence from the U.S.A., 327 Scl. 576
(2010).
54. Ricardo Perez-Truglia, A Samuelsonian Validation Test for Happiness Data
(Aug. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
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upbeat moods, on dates auctions take place has statistically and economically
significant positive impacts upon auction selling prices in a sample that in-
cludes art prices of auctions conducted from 1786 to 1909 in England.55 Sim-
ilarly, in several field and laboratory experiments, as exposure to sunlight
increased, negative affect decreased and consumers' spending increased.56
Some medical objective outcomes of well-being appear to closely track
subjective measures of experienced well-being. For example, measures of
heart rates appear to have the potential to be proxies for mental strain.57 Peo-
ple who self-report more happiness also systematically report lower hyper-
tension levels, suggesting that high blood pressure readings are potential
signs of reduced well-being.58 Individuals who report positive affect have
less cortisol output, lower neuroendocrine, inflammatory, and cardiovascular
activity, and reduced inflammatory markers, such as C-reactive protein and
interleukin-6.59
Sometimes objective outcomes of well-being and subjective measures
of experienced well-being can diverge. For example, negotiators often face
and have to make trade-offs between objective-economic or subjective-so-
cial-psychological outcomes. 60 Another example is marketing Professor
Jonathan Levav's extensive analysis of medical and psychological research.6
It demonstrates that objective outcomes of well-being, such as measures of
physical and mental health, are highly correlated with life circumstances and
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1658747 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (providing
quantitative test results that support reported life satisfaction data being a valid
measure of experienced utility).
55. Doron Kliger et al., Auction Prices and the Weather: New Evidence from Old
Masters (Aug. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1666550 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
56. Kyle B. Murray et al., The Effect of Weather on Consumer Spending, 17 J.
RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVICES 512 (2010).
57. David G. Blanchflower et al., Biomarkers, Well-Being, and Income, Presenta-
tion at 6th IZA Prize Conference Frontiers in Labor Economics: The Econom-
ics of Well-Being and Happiness (Oct. 24, 2009).
58. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Hypertension and Happiness
Across Nations, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 218 (2008).
59. Andrew Steptoe et al., Positive Affect and Psychobiological Processes Relevant
to Health, 77 J. PERSONALITY 1747, 1747 (2009).
60. See, e.g., Jared R. Curhan & Ashley D. Brown, Parallel and Divergent
Predictors of Objective and Subjective Value in Negotiation, in OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 579 (Kim S. Cameron &
Gretchen M. Spreitzer eds., 2011).
61. See generally Jonathan Levav, The Mind and the Body: Subjective Well-Being
in an Objective World, in Do EMOTIONS HURT OR HELP DECISION MAKING?
315, 316-24 (Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy Baumesiter, George Loewenstein eds.,
2007).
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events.62 However, his analysis also shows that people's self-reports of well-
being, reflecting subjective experiences, often exhibit little or no correlation
with objective circumstances.63 Levav suggests that this divergence is due to
differences in processing times from a dual-level processing of events and
circumstances.64 First, there is a cognitive and conscious level that judgments
of subjective well-being capture. 65 And second, there is a biological and sub-
conscious level that medical objective outcomes capture. 66 In other words,
any event or circumstance in a person's life can leave multiple "memory
traces."67 These include "bodily" memories in terms of bodily sensitizations
or vulnerabilities and cognitive memories that people tap into upon reporting
their subjective well-being judgments.68 Levav proposes alternative psycho-
logical explanations.69 One, memory decay, explains why subjective well-
being measures fail to capture how some life events alter people's uncon-
scious mental structures.7 0 Another explanation is the idea of "assumptive
world schemas" that govern how incoming information is assimilated
mentally.71
Economist Carol Graham has termed one concern with experienced sub-
jective well-being captured by self-reports of happiness as a "paradox of
happy peasants and miserable millionaires."72 Graham notes that optimism
among poor individuals can be a tool for their survival.73 She further ob-
62. See, e.g., Janice K. Kiecolt-Glaser et al., Marital Stress: Immunologic,
Neuroendocrine, and Autonomic Correlates, 840 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scl. 656
(1998) (reporting in a study of 90 newlywed and 31 older couples that negative
or hostile behaviors during abrasive marital conflict is associated with higher
levels of epinephrine, norepinephrine, growth hormone, and ACTH in addition
to more immunological changes over the subsequent twenty-four hour period).
63. See, e.g., Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis:
A Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. GEN. 3 (2005) (finding that hemodialysis patients report being just as
happy as healthy controls).





69. Id. at 325-31.
70. Levav, supra note 61 at 325.
71. Id. at 326-29.
72. See generally CAROL GRAHAM, HAPPINESS AROUND THE WORLD: THE PARA-
DOX OF HAPPY PEASANTS AND MISERABLE MILLIONAIRES (2009).
73. P. Stefan Kruger & Schalk W.P. Engelbrecht, Happiness around the World: the
Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires, 5 APPLIED RES.
QUALITY LIFE 165, 167 (2010) (reviewing Graham's book).
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serves that parents who are poor may revise their own personal expectations
downward but maintain hopeful expectations for their children.74 Peasants
report being happy due to lowered expectations and (perhaps some) hedonic
adaptation.75 Millionaires report misery due to envy towards even richer peo-
ple and (perhaps unrealistic) higher expectations.76 To what extent should
law be more concerned over self-reported unhappiness of rich people or
about increasing self-reported happiness of poor folks? Should it encourage
or nudge poor individuals to expect more of their future? Aspirations and
expectations about future circumstances in relation to reference points of cur-
rent situations can obviously influence self-assessments and self-reports of
happiness.77
It should be unsurprising, based upon personal introspection, that objec-
tive outcomes and subjective experiences are often interrelated.78 Further-
more, they can exhibit potentially complex interactions79 and non-linear
dynamics.80 Huang analyzes empirical and experimental evidence demon-
strating that investors' moods influence their financial behavior,81 and he
provides a case study, empirical and experimental data, and theoretical mod-
els of how irrational anxiety and exuberance changes behaviors and beliefs in
securities markets.82 Economics, law, and policy emphasize such objective
outcomes as economic development, growth, and progress. However, this
emphasis is due-at least in part-to such variables being observable to and
verifiable by third parties. A historical and traditional suspicion about subjec-
74. Id.
75. See id. at 168.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See generally Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Hap-
piness, & Trust?, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 257 (2008).
79. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 1236-43 (explaining how people's behavior, feel-
ings, perceptions and thoughts influence, and are influenced by, each other as
part of interacting systems, self-fulfilling prophecies, and often colliding
systems).
80. See, e.g., Barbara L. Fredrickson & Marcial F. Losada, Positive Affect and the
Complex Dynamics of Human Flourishing, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 678, 679-85
(2005) (arguing that a ratio of at least 2.9 in positive to negative affect charac-
terizes flourishing as opposed to languishing individuals, teams, relationships,
and mental health).
81. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Materiality of Information and Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. 99, 102-08 (2005).
82. Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities
Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 505-18
(Francesco Paresi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
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tive variables is attributable to them being unobservable to and unverifiable
by third parties. But, as economist Andrew J. Oswald cogently observes:
Economic performance is not intrinsically interesting. No one is
concerned in a genuine sense about the level of gross national
product last year or about next year's exchange rate. People have
no innate interest in the money supply, inflation, growth, inequal-
ity, unemployment, and the rest. The stolid greyness of the busi-
ness pages of our newspapers seems to mirror the fact that
economic numbers matter only indirectly. The relevance of eco-
nomic performance is that it may be a means to an end. That end
is not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the accumulation of
television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of interest
rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind's feeling of well-be-
ing. Economic things matter only in so far as they make people
happier.83
There is a lively debate over whether governments can easily and
pragmatically utilize happiness research in determining policy, and if so, how
this can be accomplished.84 Professors Kahneman and Sugden introduce a
methodology of policy evaluation, based on experienced utility, to environ-
mental economics.85 This methodology avoids well-known problems of pref-
erence anomalies for contingent valuation studies.86 Law in general should
incorporate, measure, quantify, and take into account emotional impacts that
include but are not limited to just happiness.87 Former French President Nico-
83. Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815,
1815 (1997).
84. See, e.g., Ryan Blitstein, Should the Government Make Us Happy, MILLER-
MCCUNE, May 19, 2008, at 36-45, available at http://www.psmag.com/naviga-
tion/books-and-culture/should-the-government-make-us-happy-2-4541 / (asking
why the U.S. government has not yet followed European and other govern-
ments in applying happiness research to policy); John F. Helliwell & Christo-
pher P. Barrington-Leigh, Viewpoint: Measuring and Understanding Subjective
Well-Being, 43 CAN. J. ECON. 729, 745-48 (2010) (proposing applications of
different subjective well-being measures to policy and providing particular ex-
amples in macroeconomic and microeconomic settings); Rick Swedloff, The
Trouble with Happiness, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 763 (2014) (arguing that empirical
happiness research cannot inform policy without additional and significant the-
oretical foundational undergirding about the meaning of well-being and tempo-
ral differences in happiness).
85. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a
Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161, 161-77
(2005) (exploring this possibility).
86. Id.
87. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, supra
note 78, at 308 (making this proposal).
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las Sarkozy recently created a commission on the measurement of economic
performance and social progress.88 It is chaired by 2001 Nobel Laureate in
Economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz.89 In a report, this commission recommended
that, "[m]easures of both objective and subjective well-being provide key
information about people's quality of life. Statistical offices should incorpo-
rate questions to capture people's life evaluations, hedonic experiences and
priorities in their own survey."90 Economists Sonja C. Kassenboehmer and
Christoph M. Schmidt analyzed quality-of-life indicators that are suggested
in the Stiglitz Report.9' They found that much of the variation in many well-
being measures is already well-captured by such traditional economic indica-
tors as GDP and the unemployment rate.92 But because the correlation of
alternative indicators with monetary measures is far from perfect, there is
room to augment traditional statistical reporting by non-standard indicators.93
British Prime Minister David Cameron recently announced similar plans
to collect national well-being measures that incorporate life satisfaction.94
Economists Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet critically analyze various
alternatives to GDP, including subjective well-being indexes.95 Oswald ar-
gues that countries are capable of and should measure their emotional pros-
perity and focus on mental well-being.96 Oswald summarizes seven studies
that suggest emotional prosperity and broad measures of psychological well-
88. See COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SO-
CIAL PROGRESS, http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2014).
89. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
2001, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laure
ates/2001/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
90. Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., Report by the Commission on the Measurement of
Economic Performance and Social Progress, COMMISSION ON THE MEASURE-
MENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 16, http://www.stig
litz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport anglais.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
91. See generally Sonja C. Kassenboehmer & Christoph M. Schmidt, Beyond GDP
and Back: What is the Value-Added by Additional Components of Welfare
Measurement? (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5453, Jan.
2011), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp5453.pdf (providing this analysis).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Mark Whitehouse, Nations Seek Success Beyond GDP, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704064504
576070343252409876.html.
95. MARC FLEURBAEY & DIDIER BLANCHET, BEYOND GDP: MEASURING WELFARE
AND ACCESSING SUSTAINABILITY (2013).
96. Andrew J. Oswald, Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission, 48 BRIT.
J. INDUs. REL. 651, 653-60 (2010) (presenting arguments in favor of measur-
ing a nation's emotional prosperity).
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being have recently been declining over time.97 Combining data on consump-
tion, inequality, leisure, and mortality, economists Charles I. Jones and Peter
J. Klenow propose a simple summary statistic for a country's flow of well-
being.98 Economists Frey and Stutzer caution that a policy of maximizing
aggregate happiness faces many difficulties including reducing people
merely to happiness metric stations as well as discounting problems with
political institutions and incentive distortion.99 Instead, they propose two
practical ways to use happiness research in policy: (1) identifying institutions
that best assist people in achieving their personal goals, which in turn con-
tributes maximally to individual happiness, and (2) providing crucial infor-
mational input to the political discussion process.100 Instead of maximizing a
measure of aggregate happiness, it might be more politically feasible to mini-
mize a measure of aggregate misery, stress, or unhappiness,10 such as the U-
index,102 which measures the fraction of time that people spend experiencing
unpleasant emotions. The U-index provides empirical information about neg-
ative emotional experiences that may be important to society. Another way to
incorporate happiness data into policy analysis is by introducing maximum
levels of a measure of unhappiness or minimum levels of a measure of happi-
ness as constraints on government policies. In order to be viable, government
policies would be required to satisfy these constraints when optimizing some
objective function or goal besides happiness or unhappiness. This approach is
analogous to philosopher Robert Nozick's approach to incorporating rights as
constraints that are not to be violated, as opposed to rights as part of a policy
goal to be optimized.103 Professor De Prycker believes that actual incorpora-
tion of happiness research into policy implicates a number of value-loaded
97. Id. at 660-64 (presenting overviews of these empirical findings).
98. Charles I. Jones & Peter J. Klenow, Beyond GDP? Welfare across Countries
and Time (National Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16352, 2010),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16352 (presenting data showing this
although this metric is highly correlated with per capita GDP, there are often
economically significant deviations).
99. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Public Choice, 144 PUB.
CHOICE 557, 566-69 (2010).
100. Id. at 569-70 (making these proposals).
101. Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Institutions, Law, and Pol-
icy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 589, 592 (Shane J. Lo-
pez & C. R. Snyder eds., 2d ed. 2011).
102. Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of
Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 19-20 (proposing, defining, and
suggesting policy applications of U-index); Kahneman, supra note 11, at
393-95.
103. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).
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ethical, ideological, and moral issues.104 Conversely, Professor Veenhoven
believes that empirical research about life satisfaction refutes all theoretical
philosophical objections against the greatest happiness principle.05 Professor
Ott maintains that governments can increase average happiness, eventually
reduce happiness inequalities, and realize both purposively by non-controver-
sial means.106
According to psychologist Barbara Fredrickson, benevolent social plan-
ners can utilize happiness research by helping people achieve better out-
comes and gain greater meaning from their experiences.107 She observes that:
[N]ormal individuals strive harder-and suffer more costs-to re-
peat experiences that include high meaning positive affects (e.g.
love, interest/flow) than to repeat those that include only low
meaning positive affect (e.g. pleasure, comfort). Likewise, they
most actively avoid experiences that include high meaning nega-
tive affects (e.g. shame, remorse), but may routinely endure those
that include only low meaning negative affect (e.g. anxiety, dis-
gust). Moreover, these relations should hold regardless of affect
intensity. Even moderate intensity episodes of remorse, for exam-
ple, may be dreaded more than high intensity episodes of
anxiety. 108
She further provides a hypothetical of a woman who rates the experience of
love she felt while playing in a park with her young son as a seven while
separately rating the experience of pleasure she felt eating the best instance
of a particular food she has ever had as a ten.109 Fredrickson observes that
such a woman's numerical happiness ratings are likely made on different
ordinal scales,110 and thus a benevolent social planner should probably refrain
from having that woman spend less time in a park with her son and more
time eating that particular food item.' Because people's descriptive labels
104. Val6rie De Prycker, Happiness on the Political Agenda? PROS and CONS, 11
J. HAPPINESS STUD. 585, 585-600 (2010) (making this argument).
105. Ruut Veenhoven, Greater Happiness for a Greater Number: Is that Possible
and Desirable?, 11 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 605, 605-27 (2010).
106. See generally Jan Ott, Greater Happiness for a Greater Number.: Some Non-
controversial Options for Governments, II J. HAPPINESS STUD. 631 (2010).
107. Barbara L. Fredrickson, Extracting Meaning from Past Affective Experiences:
The Importance of Peaks, Ends, and Specific Emotions, 14 COGNITION & EMO-
TION 577, 596-603 (2000).
108. Id. at 595.
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for and numerical ratings of affective states are very likely to be imprecise,]12
it is likely is reasonable that individuals evaluate moments of love at seven
against one set of benchmarks, and moments of pleasure at ten relative to a
different set of reference points.113
Echoing Fredrickson's concerns, behavioral economist George Lowen-
stein proposes that time-use surveys ask people not just about how much
positive and negative affect is felt during a particular activity, but also if
people believed that a particular activity was a valuable or worthwhile use of
their time as opposed to a waste of their time.14 Psychologists White and
Dolan ask people not just about how they felt during a particular activity, but
also six additional questions focusing on non-hedonic aspects of experience
such as being engaged, being focused, and finding meaning.'5 These funda-
mental insights into how people care not only about positive affect, but also
about meaning in their lives, raise questions about whether the law should
care more about positive affect versus meaning in people's lives.
A legitimate source of uneasiness about basing social policies upon ag-
gregation of empirical happiness data is a recent quantitative analysis of cer-
tain mathematical properties of empirical happiness data that continue to
remain contentious among economists, 16-namely, additivity, cardinality,
and neutrality of such data, even though psychologists have been able to
address how to make international, interpersonal, and intertemporal compari-
sons of happiness data to some degree.17 This mathematical analysis also
serves to provide a cautionary, persuasive critique of a recent proposal for
governments to eschew cost-benefit analysis and instead determine and eval-
uate policy based upon aggregation of happiness, defined simply as exper-
ienced positive feeling.118
A middle-of-the-road position in response to situations and times when
indicia of objective outcomes and subjective happiness measures diverge is
to privilege neither category of variables. Instead, law can and should take
112. Id.
113. Fredrickson, supra note 107, at 601.
114. George Loewenstein, That which Makes Life Worthwhile, in MEASURING THE
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE
AND WELL-BEING 87, 104 (Alan B. Krueger ed., 2009).
115. Mathew P. White & Paul Dolan, Accounting for the Richness of Daily Activi-
ties, 20 PSYCHOL. ScI. 1000, 1001-07 (2009).
116. See generally Ingebjorg Kristoffersen, The Metrics of Subjective Wellbeing:
Cardinality, Neutrality and Additivity, 86 ECON. REC. 98 (2010) (presenting
empirical and theoretical evidence of alternative hypotheses about whether
self-reported happiness is cardinal, strictly ordinal, or ratio quality, and hence
meaningfully additive).
117. Id.
118. See generally John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583,
1628-41 (2010) (arguing for this proposal).
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into account both objective outcomes and self-reports about subjective exper-
iences. If objective outcomes and self-reports about subjective experiences
converge, then law can proceed more confidently than if based upon just one
category of variables. Alternatively, if objective outcomes and self-reports
about subjective experiences disagree, then the law can and should under-
stand why they diverge. Levav explains how divergences in biological versus
cognitive processing times of events help categorize biases in predictions of
subjective well-being, which in turn has implications for public policy.119 For
example, Levav suggests that paternalism could be justified in situations in-
volving environmental pathogens,120 because he believes in rejecting any
public policy that neglects objective health outcomes just because those out-
comes have little or no long-term impact on measures of subjective well-
being.121 In support, Levav observes that even though a doctor usually starts
a medical visit by asking patients how they feel (subjective experiences), a
doctor then performs a thorough physical health examination that includes
taking measures of blood pressure and heart rate (objective outcomes). 122
Levav concludes that:
[A]n attempt to ascertain the effect of an event or circumstance
through measures of affective judgment (that is, through SWB
[Subjective Well-Being]) fails to capture sufficiently its conse-
quences. This becomes especially important when extracting pub-
lic-policy recommendations from responses to SWB
questionnaires. Failure to realize the multiple effects of an event
and their timing can lead to policies that are detrimental to the
goal of increasing a population's well-being.123
B. Moments in Experiences and Memories of Them
"And I don't know if it's a memory, or memory of a memory I'm left
with." 124
Kahneman aptly characterizes people's tendency of remembering and
evaluating their happiness differently from how they experience and live. He
states a difference between, on the one hand, being happy about or with your
life, and on the other hand, being happy in actually living your life.125 He
attributes this difference to people directing their attention to different as-
pects of their lives when thinking about life in comparison to actually living
119. Levav, supra note 61, at 334-35.




124. EL SECRETO DE SUS Ojos, supra note 16.
125. Kahneman, Experience vs. Memory, supra note 11.
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it.126 He references a study he and a coauthor conducted, concerning whether
living in California can make people happy and happier than living in the
Midwest.127 Even though groups of college students in California and the
Midwest believe that people such as themselves are happier living in Califor-
nia,128 both groups actually self-report virtually identical overall experienced
happiness.29 It is true that Californians are much happier with their
weather,130 but both groups vastly overestimate how much weather impacts
their overall experienced happiness.131 If Midwestern undergraduates focus
on emotional adaptation rather than the weather, their predictions of life sat-
isfaction levels for their peers living in California decrease.132
In his talk, Kahneman engages in a thought experiment to evaluate what
happens when people move from Ohio to California to pursue happiness.133
Although he notes that such people's experiencing selves are not happier
than before, they nonetheless think they are happier because they will no
longer have to endure Ohio's harsh weather.134 As a result, people feel they
made the right choice to move to California.135
But, who is to say they did not? Should we not believe and defer to
people's evaluated and remembered happiness when and if that differs from
their experienced happiness? After all, people's own (possibly inaccurate)
evaluations and (certainly incomplete) memories of their happiness are what
ultimately they care about and will both remember and anticipate in compari-
son with their actual experiences of happiness, which are by necessity only
ephemeral, fleeting, and momentary. Even if people are on average no hap-
pier in California, there are undeniably objective differences between Ohio
126. Id.
127. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make Peo-
ple Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 340, 341 (1998).
128. Id. at 343. But see Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic
Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emo-
tional Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 119-21
(2005) (failing to replicate this finding of Schkade & Kahneman's and instead
reporting that University of Michigan undergraduates did not predict higher life
satisfaction ratings in California than in Michigan).
129. Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 127, at 342-43.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 343.
132. Ubel et al., supra note 128, at 119-22 (presenting details of this research).
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and California,136 with some of those differences partially due to weather
conditions, such as literally how green is the grass. 137
1. Self-Reports of Happiness
A central question in happiness research asks "[h]ow do we determine if
people enjoy what they do?"138 While neoclassical economics relies on peo-
ple's choices to reveal their preferences,139 psychology and other social sci-
ences rely on self-reports of enjoyment.140 Self-reports can be divided into
three types: (1) global reports;' 4' (2) concurrently experienced reports, 42
based upon the Experience Sampling Method (ESM), 143 which has developed
a reputation for being the gold standard of self-report procedures due to its
contemporaneous and immediate nature; 44 and (3) recent retrospective re-
136. Levav, supra note 61, at 315 (contrasting psychologists finding little or no cor-
relation between experienced happiness and objective circumstances with phy-
sicians finding circumstances and life events being highly related to physical
and mental health).
137. "I know a place where the grass is really greener." KATY PERRY, California
Gurls, on TEENAGE DREAM (Capital Records 2010).
138. Norbert Schwarz et al., Global and Episodic Reports of Hedonic Experience, in
CALENDAR AND TIME DIARY METHODS IN LIFE COURSE RESEARCH 157, 157
(Robert F. Belli, Frank P. Stafford, & Duane F. Alwin eds., 2009).
139. See Richard A. Epstein, Happiness and Revealed Preferences in Evolutionary
Perspective, 33 VT. L. REV. 559, 561, 567-71 (2009) (criticizing and question-
ing general conclusions of happiness literature to argue for neoclassical eco-
nomics' traditional emphasis on revealed preferences).
140. Schwarz et al., supra note 138, at 157.
141. F. THOMAS JUSTER, TIME, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING (Frank P. Stafford ed.,
1985); JOHN P. ROBINSON, How AMERICANS USE TIME: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY BEHAVIOR (1977).
142. See, e.g., Arthur A. Stone et al., Ecological Momentary Assessment, in WELL-
BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 26 (Daniel Kahneman,
Ed Diener, & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999) (advocating usefulness of momen-
tary assessment of experiences, or Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA)
as they name it, by discussing problems of traditional retrospective perspective
and comparing these with advantages of momentary, or nearly immediate, mea-
surement forms of self-reporting, and convincingly arguing for benefits of
EMA, including new insights in such areas as stress and coping, mood and
physiological processes, and psychiatric symptoms); Saul Shiffman et al., Eco-
logical Momentary Assessment, 4 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2008)
(discussing the rationale for EMA, its designs, methodological and practical
issues, and comparisons of EMA with recall data).
143. See, e.g., JOEL M. HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASUR-
ING THE QUALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 277 (2006).
144. But see Tamlin S. Conner et al., Idiographic Personality: The Theory and
Practice of Experience Sampling, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN
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ports, such as the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM)145 and the Event Re-
construction Method (ERM).146 Global reports of enjoyment usually
converge with choices, but neither may capture people's actual experience in
situ. 147 Concurrent and retrospective episodic reports converge with actual
hedonic experiences, but can fail to predict behaviors and choices.148 Re-
searchers can influence their data and conclusions by using a specific type of
report. For example, according to a DRM study, employed people self-report
higher life satisfaction than those who are unemployed.49 They also report
more positive feelings when participating in similar activities.150 But upon
weighting these activities with their duration, average experienced utility be-
tween the employed and unemployed does not differ.15' Unemployed people
compensate for such a saddening effect by spending time in more pleasurable
ways while the employed work.152
While people's fleeting and momentary feelings can be accessed by in-
trospection for accurate concurrent emotional reporting based upon experien-
tial information, global reports of previous emotions are reconstructed based
upon semantic knowledge drawing upon general beliefs about emotions and
situations.53 Reports about recent specific episodes are between real-time
and past emotional reports. 5 4 People can use recent specific episode reports
to draw upon episodic memory to retrieve specific details and moments from
their recent past.155
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 79, 91-92 (Richard W. Robbins, R. Chris Fraley &
Robert F. Krueger eds., 2007) (arguing that ESM is not inherently better than
other types of self-reporting procedure, just different; sometimes inappropriate
depending on circumstances, and suffers the same limitations facing other self-
reporting procedures).
145. Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Expe-
rience: The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 Sci. 1776 (2004).
146. Schwarz et al., supra note 138, at 162.
147. Id. at 158.
148. Id. at 159.
149. Andreas Knabe et al., Dissatisfied with Life but Having a Good Day: Time-Use
and Well-being of the Unemployed, 120 ECON. J. 867, 875-85 (2010) (report-
ing results of the research).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 876, 879.
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2. Duration Neglect and the Peak-and-End Rule
People's retrospective global evaluations of such aversive experiences
as being exposed to continuous mild noise, carrying weights, maintaining a
strained posture, or wearing a breathing apparatus all follow a peak-end
rule.156 Across many types of affective experiences, people's memories neg-
lect duration and focus instead on their peak affect intensity and the ending
of the memory.157 A peak-end rule means that global retrospective evalua-
tions can be predicted by a weighted average of peak affect during an experi-
ence and value of affect upon the end of an experience.58 Evidence of the
peak-end rule is supported by the retrospective reactions people have to their
diverse affective experiences such as undergoing a colonoscopy,159 receiving
gifts of DVDs or Halloween candy,160 immersing a hand in cold water,' 6'
enduring lithotripsies,62 and viewing aversive and pleasant film clips.163
Fredrickson proposes that people focus on affective peaks and ends not
due to perceptual salience, rather, because people are carriers of personal
meaning.64 She proposes that people remember moments of peak affect from
an experience because those moments provide them information of their per-
156. Carol Varey & Daniel Kahneman, Experiences Extended Across Time: Evalua-
tion of Moments and Episodes, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 169, 172-84
(1992).
157. See, e.g., Fredrickson, supra note 107, at 577-96 (reviewing empirical research
about peak-end rule to conclude that data in support of peak-and-end rule is
robust, but qualified by such other aspects of affective experiences as trends
and velocity of intensity changes that also predict global evaluations of
episodes).
158. But see Talya Miron-Shatz, Evaluating Multiepisode Events: Boundary Condi-
tions for the Peak-End Rule, 9 EMOTION 206, 208-12 (2009) (reporting that for
multi-episode events, retrospective evaluations consider subjectively exper-
ienced lows, and sometimes peaks, depend on averaged ratings of emotions,
ignore ends; additionally, lows and peaks contribute more to comparative as
opposed to absolute evaluations).
159. Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Memories of Colonoscopy: A Randomized Trial,
104 PAIN 187, 188-93 (2003).
160. Amy M. Do et al., Evaluations of Pleasurable Experiences: The Peak-End
Rule, 15 PSYCHONOMIc BULL. & REv. 96, 96-98 (2008).
161. Daniel Kahneman et al., When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better
End, 4 PSYCHOL. Sci. 401, 401-04 (1993).
162. Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients' Memories of Painful
Medical Treatments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Mini-
mally Invasive Procedures, 66 PAIN 3, 4-7, fig. I, tbls.I, 1I, & III (1996).
163. Barbara L. Fredrickson & Daniel Kahneman, Duration Neglect in Retrospec-
tive Evaluations of Affective Episodes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
45, 46-55 (1993).
164. Fredrickson, supra note 107, at 589-90.
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sonal capacity to achieve, endure, or cope with that experience again.165 She
proposes that people remember moments of ending affect from an experience
because those moments convey that an experience is complete, knowable,
over, past, and thus now accessible with relative certainty.66
Based upon psychological research findings about duration neglect,
criminal law professor Paul Robinson and psychology professor John Darley
argue that society is not likely to deter criminals by lengthening prison
sentences. 167 Law professor Thomas Ulen very sensibly responds:
The suggestion is that it does not matter whether we put people
into some sort of unpleasant confinement for a year, three years,
or five years; that is not what they are going to remember about
their incarceration. Rather, they are more likely to remember the
"peak-and-end" experiences. As a result, they argue, making pun-
ishment more certain or more severe is not going to have any de-
terrence effect on criminals.
That conclusion strikes me as far-fetched, to say the least. And it
also suggests that if they wanted to pursue this further, then we
ought to confine criminals, no matter how hideous the crime, for a
relatively short time (thereby saving valuable resources), but make
sure that on their way out of prison we beat the daylights out of
them so that the last thing they remember is something extremely
unpleasant. So, no matter how long the imprisonment lasted, the
now-released prisoners do not want to repeat it again-just as the
vacationer does not want to return to the Caribbean, no matter
how nice the vacation truly was, if the central memory he has of
that trip is of lost luggage. Now, that seems to me a facile applica-
tion of what is a potentially very interesting psychological
finding.168
Law Professor Jeremy A. Blumenthal points out that even death row inmates
can adapt hedonically to prison69 and relatives of crime victims can adapt
hedonically to losing a loved one.' 70 It is worth pointing out that it is also
165. Id. at 590-91.
166. Id. at 591-93.
167. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 189-92 (2004).
168. Thomas S. Ulen, Remarks on the Lewis & Clark Law School Business Law
Forum: Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: Instruction or Distraction?, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 183 (2006).
169. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 45-51 (2005) (analyzing implications for capital
punishment of affective forecasting errors about hedonic adaptation).
170. Id. at 39-42 (analyzing implications for victim impact statements of affective
forecasting errors about hedonic adaptation).
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unknown how much inmates vary in their memories of punishment exper-
iences and upon what that variation depends.171
i. Benefits of Incomplete Emotional Memories
People's emotional memories depend upon their current emotional state,
their perceptions and appraisals of past experiences, their coping mecha-
nisms, and their personality traits.172 Psychologists Linda Levine, Martin
Safer, and Heather Lench assert that misremembering emotions by focusing
on affective peaks and ends of past experiences can promote such goal-di-
rected behavior as authoring articles, climbing mountains, conducting re-
search, having children, and raising children.173 They also explain how
incomplete and inaccurate affective memories also can facilitate people's
abilities to cope with ongoing challenges,174 such as coping with a spouse's
midlife death,t75 maintaining positive long-term relationships,]76 and under-
going psychotherapy.177 In fact, even implicit measures of couples' affective
memories of their marriage can predict divorce better than observational
measures of marital problem-solving and better than self-reports of current
marital satisfaction that can be informed by explicit memories.178
171. Id.
172. Linda J. Levine & Martin A. Safer, Sources of Bias in Memory for Emotions,
11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 169, 169-72 (2002) (providing and
reviewing supporting empirical evidence).
173. Linda J. Levine et al., Remembering and Misremembering Emotions, in JUDG-
MENTS OVER TIME: THE INTERPLAY OF THOUGHTS, FEELINGS, AND BEHAVIORS
271, 282-83 (Lawrence J. Sanna & Edward C. Chang eds., 2006).
174. Id. at 283-84.
175. Martin A. Safer et al., "It Was Never that Bad": Biased Recall of Grief and
Long-Term Adjustment to the Death of a Spouse, 9 MEMORY 195, 197-203
(2001).
176. Benjamin R. Karney & Robert H. Coombs, Memory Bias in Long-Term Close
Relationships: Consistency or Improvement, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 959, 961-69 (2000) (presenting details of this research). See
also Susan Sprecher, "I Love You More Today than Yesterday": Romantic
Partners' Perception of Changes in Love and Related Affect Over Time, 76 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 46, 47-52 (1999) (presenting details of a study
finding that romantic partners' reports about perceived changes in their love,
commitment, and satisfaction correlate positively with actual changes in their
love, commitment, and satisfaction in addition to future relationship stability).
177. Martin A. Safer & David J. Keuler, Individual Differences in Misremembering
Pre-Psychotherapy Distress: Personality and Memory Distortion, 2 EMOTION
162, 164-75 (2002).
178. Kim Therese Buehlman et al., How A Couple Views Their Past Predicts Their
Future: Predicting Divorce from an Oral History Interview, 5 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 295, 297-318 (1992).
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People undergo a myriad of powerful emotional ups and downs every
day, hour, and sometimes even within a few moments. 7 9 Thereby having a
memory system that preserves all of a person's minute details of every expe-
rience would prove unduly burdensome to function as a guide for future be-
haviors, intentions, and preferences.180 Additionally, if people's beliefs,
circumstances, and goals undergo change, their more distant emotional mem-
ories are not as likely to be relevant as their more recent memories.81 That
people's affective memories fade with time is therefore at least efficient and
is at most evolutionarily adaptive.182
People's emotions are not only their internal states of arousal and va-
lence, but they also signal perceived relationships between people's circum-
stances and their beliefs, goals, and values. 83 Only by conceptualizing
people's emotional memories as records of their actual historical internal
states does it follow that reconstructing emotional memories is doomed to
suffer from biases and inaccuracies.184 But, a realization that emotional mem-
ories record ongoing relationships between past events and a person's goals
implies that such emotional records are more accurate if one updates them
based upon his or her current goals and beliefs.185 As Levine, Safer, and
Lench nicely state it, "[iun the same way, updating a map when new roads are
built makes it more accurate."186 Memory's chief purpose could be to guide
people's future behavior instead of being a faithful record of their past. 8 7
Because people's current appraisals of an experience inform their emotional
memories, those memories can better function to guide their future behav-
ior.188 As Levine and Safer conclude, "[p]eople's memories for emotions pro-
vide highly condensed and accessible summaries of the relevance of past
experiences to current goals."189
179. Levine et al., supra note 173, at 280.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Robert W. Hendersen, Fearful Memories: The Motivational Significance of
Forgetting, in AFFECT, CONDITIONING, AND COGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE DE-
TERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOR 43, 44-53 (F. Robert Brush & J. Bruce Overmier
eds., 1985) (reviewing evidence suggesting that interpreting memories of im-
portant events necessitates understanding motivational significance of such
memories); Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psy-
chology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, .196-97.






189. Levine & Safer, supra note 172, at 169.
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Neuroscientists Larry Cahill, James McGaugh, and Elizabeth Parker
discovered that a few people can recall detailed moment-to-moment events
from their entire lives.190 They proposed the word "hyperthymesia" to de-
scribe such extremely superior autobiographical memory.'91 Actress Marilu
Henner, who is perhaps best known for her starring role as Elaine O'Connor-
Nardo on the popular television program "Taxi,"192 is the only one of six
Americans diagnosed to have such nearly endless memories,193 that has chil-
dren or is married (her current marriage is her third). This suggests that hav-
ing a good relationship could be related to being able to forget, and hence
lose, some arguments. 194
Psychologist Pascal Boyer suggests that "distorted" memories can be
part of a highly efficient and functional biological system that balances costs
of information storage and retrieval of past experiences against benefits of
utilizing memories to improve present fitness-enhancing decision-making.95
Incomplete and selective memories, viewed as beliefs about past occur-
rences, can thus be seen to be particular examples of functionally adaptive
misbeliefs generally.196 Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger, a professor of internet
governance and regulation, explains how forgetting played important roles
during the history of humankind, ranging from facilitating forgiveness that
provided opportunities for second chances to helping people make sound de-
cisions that were not encumbered by their past. 197 He also analyzes how digi-
tal technology makes it possible to end forgetting and illustrates problems
from and solutions to everlasting digital memory. 98
190. Elizabeth S. Parker et al., A Case of Unusual Autobiographical Remembering,
12 NEUROCASE 35 (2006).
191. Id. at 47.
192. Taxi (ABC, NBC television series 1978-1983).
193. Alexandra Cheney, Marilu Henner on Her Extraordinary Memory, WALL ST.
J. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2010/12/22/
marilu-henner-explains-her-amazing-memory/.
194. 60 Minutes: The Gift of Endless Memory (CNN television newsmagazine
broadcast Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-gift-
of-endless-memory/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (suggesting this possibility).
195. Pascal Boyer, Extending the Range of Adaptive Misbelief- Memory "Distor-
tions" as Functional Features, 32 BRAIN & BEHAV. Sci. 513, 513-14 (2009).
196. Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett, The Evolution of Misbelief, 32 BRAIN &
BEHAV. Sci. 493 (2009).
197. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FOR-
GETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009).
198. Id.
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ii. Waiting, Anticipation, and Reconstruction
People consistently neglect duration in making overall judgments of a
character's quality of life, and instead emphasize how characters' lives
end.199 This produces ratings that contradict a simplistic hedonic calculus that
just adds up years of pleasure and pain.200 People display a "James Dean
Effect," whereby they rate a wonderful life that ends abruptly as being better
than a wonderful life having additional but only mildly pleasant years.201
People also exhibit an "Alexander Solzhenitsyn Effect," in which they rate a
terrible life with additional moderately bad years as being more desirable
than a terrible life that ends abruptly without having those unpleasant
years.202 In contrast, people show evidence of weaker effects for a life having
additional but less intense years embedded between ages forty and forty-five
instead of at its end.203 This indicates that a life's end has special importance
and that its effect on people's quality of life judgments is not just due to
averaging different periods of life.204
This empirical happiness research about how a life's end takes on
unique significance in life evaluation echoes Aristotle's observation in
Nicomachean Ethics.205 In this work, Aristotle notes that "since many
changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous
may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan
Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly
no one calls happy."206
Posthumous reversals of fortune change external evaluators' assess-
ments of happiness and quality of life judgments in the same direction as the
valence of a posthumous event, independent of people's religiosity or how
much a life made a good or engaging story.207 People's quality of life judg-
ments being dependent upon posthumous events could be a special instance
of a more general process of retroactive re-evaluation of a particular event's
199. Id.
200. Ed Diener et al., End Effects of Rated Life Quality: The James Dean Effect, 12
PSYCHOL. ScI. 124 (2001) (presenting details of three studies demonstrating
these findings).
201. Id. at 127.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 126.
204. Id. at 127.
205. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W. D. Ross, trans., World Library Classics
1998).
206. Id.
207. Paul Rozin & Jennifer Stellar, Posthumous Events Affect Rated Quality and
Happiness of Lives, 4 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 273, 275-78 (2009)
(presenting two such empirical studies).
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effect or meaning after some other event.2 08 For example, if a person learns
after spending a terrific evening with that person's spouse, that the spouse
was unfaithful, that person's memories of that evening can become very neg-
ative.209 More broadly, as we change our attitudes or feelings towards any-
thing, it is likely that our memories of related earlier times are going to
change also.210
In constructing their autobiographical selves, people shift back memo-
ries of their moral failings and shift forward their memories of morally good
behavior.211 People are also able to maintain usually favorable self-regard via
disparagement of their distant past selves and complimenting of their recent
past selves.212 People appear to like seeing themselves as evolving into better
future selves and situate themselves differently in time than how they situate
others.213 Based upon extensive clinical studies, narrative psychologist Dan
McAdams persuasively argues that redemption is a unique theme of Ameri-
can autobiographical stories.214
Kahneman expresses concern over evaluations of past experiences be-
cause they are incorrect due to fallible memories and can result in choices
that do not maximize people's experienced affect.215 Kahneman proposes that
a true measure of an experience can be derived only upon a moment-to-
moment sampling of an individual's feelings during that experience.216
Schreiber and Kahneman distinguish between instantaneous utility, consist-
ing of people's on-line feelings about moments in their lives, and
remembered utility, entailing how poorly or well a whole event is
208. Id. at 278.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Jessica R. Escobedo & Ralph Adolphs, Becoming a Better Person: Temporal
Remoteness Biases Autobiographical Memories for Moral Events, 10 EMOTION
511, 514-18 (2010) (presenting details of this research).
212. Anne E. Wilson & Michael Ross, From Chump to Champ: People's Appraisals
of Their Earlier and Present Selves, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 572,
572-83 (2001) (presenting and testing via six experimental studies a theory of
temporal self-appraisal).
213. Benedict Carey, Why Discretions Appear Youthful, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010,
at Dl (reporting on these and related research findings).
214. See generally DAN MCADAMS, THE REDEMPTIVE SELF: STORIES AMERICANS
LIVE By (2005) (discussing the importance of redemption in American
society).
215. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 767-72 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
216. Id. at 694.
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remembered to have been after it already happened.217 Kahneman's view-
points about people's experiences and self-evaluations as competing norma-
tive guides for people and social policies have undergone change and
evolution over time.218 This is a response to developments in his own and
others' empirical research about happiness219 and hedonic adaptation.220
As Loewenstein and philosopher Jon Elster observe,221 moral philoso-
pher Jeremy Bentham realized that many experiences of pleasure and pain
are due not to direct experiences, but instead to anticipations and memories
of experiences.222 Differences in how people remember versus experience
happiness raises a fundamental normative question of which one, if either, is
more important. Maximizing experienced affect over memories of them
raises a number of issues and questions.23 Kahneman's economics Nobel
lecture discussed how people's global evaluations of episodes over time suf-
fer from biases in comparison with their actual experienced affect.224
Kahneman and Riss "urged that the experiencing self be given due regard in
217. Charles A. Schreiber & Daniel Kahneman, Determinants of the Remembered
Utility of Aversive Sounds, 129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 27, 27
(2000) (introducing this dichotomy).
218. Daniel Kahneman, From Decision Utility to Experienced Happiness, Invited
Address, Emotion Pre-Conference to Annual Meeting of the Society for Per-
sonality and Social Psychology (Jan. 27, 2011) (describing his distinction be-
tween "emotional experience and life evaluation as aspects of well-being, with
their distinctive precursors and consequences"), available at http://www.tufts
.edu/-hurry0l/emotionpreconference/speakers.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
219. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, The Sad Tale of the Aspiration Treadmill, EDGE
WORLD QUESTION CENTER, http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08-17.html#kahne
man (describing how and why Kahneman gave up on the idea of an aspiration
treadmill) (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
220. Daniel Kahneman, What Constitutes Life Satisfaction?, in WHAT HAVE YOU
CHANGED YOUR MIND ABOUT? TODAY'S LEADING MINDS RETHINK EVERY-
THING 199-200 (John Brockman ed., 2009) (describing Kahneman's changing
his views about hedonic adaptation).
221. JON ELSTER & GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, CHOICE OVER TIME, 213, 213-14
(George F. Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
222. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 28
(Jonathan Bennett ed., 2010) (1789).
223. Joel Huber et al., Thinking about Values in Prospect and Retrospect: Maximiz-
ing Experienced Utility, 8 MARKETING LETTERS 323, 327-29, 332 (1997) (dis-
cussing these issues and research questions).
224. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1465-66 (2003).
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well-being research."25 Carmon and Kahneman believe that situations in
which experiences can be more crucial than memories include painful medi-
cal procedures and waiting in queues.22 6 Influential designer Don Norman
believes that memories are more crucial than experiences in waiting lines,227
queue design,228 and generally overall.229
In a fascinating article, organizational psychologist and management
scholar Robert Sutton hypothesizes that visitors to Disneyland are likely to
remember and report positive bygone feelings they experienced during their
visits, but forget and fail to report negative ones. 230 Sutton posits that well-
documented psychological forces explain such inaccurate reconstruction of
people's emotions: (1) a Pollyanna effect; (2) editing of memories to main-
tain cognitive consistency; and (3) pressures of social norms in reconstruct-
ing past feelings.231 Sutton also suggests that these somewhat inaccurate
positive anticipations, experiences, and memories of most events in life can
be healthy and self-fulfilling232
This inclination to remember pleasant feelings but forget unpleasant
ones is accentuated by people taking photographs during their visits.233 Mem-
ories and photographs of moments in our lives are intimately related. As
novelist Milan Kundera states about how people remember love affairs,
225. Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis, Living, and Thinking about It: Two Perspec-
tives on Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 285, 300 (Felicia A. Huppert et
al. eds., 2005).
226. Ziv Carmon & Daniel Kahneman, The Experienced Utility of Queuing: Real-
Time Affect and Retrospective Evaluations of Simulated Queues 21 (1995)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.insead.edu/carmon/pdf
files/The%2OExperienced%2OUtility%20of%20Queuing.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2014).
227. Donald A. Norman, The Psychology of Waiting Lines, 15 (Aug. 21, 2008) (ex-
cerpt from an unpublished manuscript entitled "Sociable Design"), available at
http://www.jnd.org/ms/Norman%20The%2OPsychology%20of%2OWaiting%
20Lines.pdf.
228. Donald A. Norman, Designing Waits That Work, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 23,
26-27 (Summer 2009) (emphasizing importance of managing memories rather
than experiences themselves in design of waiting lines).
229. See generally Donald A. Norman, Memory Is More Important than Actuality,
16 INTERACTIONS 24 (2009).
230. See Sutton, supra note 6, at 279-80.
231. Id. at 280-81.
232. Id. at 281-84.
233. Id. at 285-86; see also Shelly E. Taylor & J D. Brown, Illusion and Well-
Being: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 193 (1998) (analyzing research literature to conclude that unrealistic
positive illusions promote mental health).
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"memory does not make films, it makes photographs."34 Perhaps to capital-
ize on this, Disneyland and Walt Disney World launched a marketing cam-
paign235 in 2010 to feature vacationers' photographs and videos in television
commercials and social media.
Furthermore, psychological research explains why people repeat and
recommend experiences, even if such experiences involve unpleasant mo-
ments.236 For instance, construal level theory predicts that details of exper-
iences fade away faster than higher-level constructs and emotions fade away
faster than cognitions.237 A related theory of how people evaluate personal
events in their lives posits that people's anticipations and memories of certain
categories of events often are more positive than actual experiences of those
events.238 This theory suggests three distinct processes to explain this phe-
nomenon: (1) Rosy Prospection, a tendency "to anticipate events as more
favorable and positive than" actual experiences; (2) Dampening, a tendency
"to minimize the favorability or pleasure of events" as people experience
them; and (3) Rosy Retrospection, a tendency to recollect and remember
events people experience "more fondly and positively" than experienced.239
Older adults exhibit more temporal realism than do young and middle-
aged adults in that, for older adults, retrospective and anticipatory life satis-
faction ratings match actual levels of satisfaction.240 In other words, young
and middle-aged adults exhibit more temporal affective illusion as defined by
their prospective and retrospective life satisfaction ratings.241 At all ages,
temporal realism is associated with more adaptive current functioning than
illusion,242 when illusion is defined as inaccuracy. More traditional defini-
234. MILAN KUNDERA, IMMORTALITY 314 (Peter Kussi trans., Grove Press, Inc. 1st
Am. ed. 1991) (1990).
235. DISNEY, http://disneyside.disneyparks.disney.go.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
236. See Norman, supra note 229, at 24-26 (explaining and summarizing this
research).
237. See Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV.
403, 405-09 (2003) (presenting details of this theory).
238. See generally Terence R. Mitchell & Leigh Thompson, A Theory of Temporal
Adjustments of the Evaluation of Events: Rosy Prospection & Rosy Retrospec-
tion, 5 ADVANCES IN MANAGERIAL COGNITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFOR-
MATION PROCESSING 85, 85-114 (1994) (developing this theory).
239. Id. at 85.
240. See Margie E. Lachman et al., Realism and Illusion in Americans' Temporal
Views of Their Life Satisfaction: Age Differences in Reconstructing the Past
and Anticipating the Future, 19 PSYCHOL. Sci. 889, 890-93 (2008).
241. See id. at tbl. 1, fig. 1.
242. See id. at 893-96.
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tions of illusion, however, are relative to some objective standard or how
others perform.243
A common belief, at least among rock stars,244 is that getting old stinks.
In an internet study of laypeople,245 both older and younger adults estimate
declining happiness from ages thirty to seventy on average, 246 despite self-
reports of current happiness being higher for older participants than for
younger participants.247 Kahneman believes that, when people think of the
future, they do not usually think of lived experiences, but instead think of
anticipated memories.248 He believes that people actually choose memories
of experiences as opposed to actual experiences.249 He sums up his viewpoint
nicely with a compelling metaphor about "remembering selves" tyrannically
dragging along "experiencing selves" through experiences that "experiencing
selves" do not want and have no voice in choosing.250 As psychologist Frede-
ric Bartlett states, "[T]he past is being continually re-made, reconstructed in
the interests of the present..."251
iii. Vacations
People largely take vacations in service of their remembering selves. As
comedian Dave Barry jokingly points out, "the human race is far too stupid
to be deterred from tourism by a mere several million years of bad exper-
iences, and today we're traveling in larger numbers than ever."252 This lies at
the heart of Kahneman's thesis: anticipated memories of experiences-as op-
243. See generally Shelley Taylor et al., Psychological Resources, Positive Illu-
sions, and Health, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 99 (2000) (suggesting that even unrealistic
optimism is a psychological resource that not only preserves mental health dur-
ing life-threatening or traumatic events, but also protects physical health); see
also Shelley Taylor et al., Portrait of the Self-Enhancer: Well Adjusted and
Well Liked or Maladjusted and Friendless?, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 165 (2003) (reporting that self-enhancement positively correlates
with multiple indicators of mental health and favorably impacts others).
244. THE WHO, My Generation, on My GENERATION (MCA 2002) (1965) ("I hope I
die before I get old .... ").
245. Heather P. Lacey et al., Hope I Die Before I Get Old: Mispredicting Happiness
Across the Adult Lifespan, 7 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 167 (2006).
246. See id. at 172, 174.
247. See id. at 171-72.
248. See Kahneman, Experience vs. Memory, supra note 11.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 309 (2d. ed., 1995).
252. DAVE BARRY, DAVE BARRY'S ONLY TRAVEL GUIDE YOU'LL EVER NEED 3-4
(1992).
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posed to anticipated experiences themselves-motivate human behavior.53
In fact, not only do prospective reports of vacation enjoyment converge with
retrospective ones, but predicted and remembered affect are also more posi-
tive than concurrent affect reported during vacations.54 For example, a com-
parison of these three affects regarding students' spring break vacations
revealed that predicted and remembered affects are both more positive and
negative than concurrently experienced affect.255 However, remembered af-
fect best predicts students' desire to take similar vacations in the future.256
Incidental emotions may also matter, due to an emotion-congruency ef-
fect; vacations with adventurous appeal are evaluated more favorably if par-
ticipants feel excited, while vacations with serene appeal are evaluated more
favorably if participants feel peaceful.257 Such an effect is not observed, how-
ever, if participants realize their feelings are incidental; the effect is mediated
by emotion's influence on participants' expectations that a vacation will de-
liver what it promises.258
Ultimately, most people want to enjoy pleasurable experiences and
avoid disagreeable ones. Kahneman correctly observes that people base their
anticipated experiences upon memories of similar experiences.59 But what if
people have no such memories of similar experiences? In that case, it would
not seem descriptively accurate to say that choices regarding possible actual
experiences are motivated completely by anticipated memories, and that no
part is played by anticipated actual experiences.
253. See generally Kahneman, Experience vs. Memory, supra note 11, at 388-90.
254. T. R. Mitchell et al., Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The
"Rosy" View, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 421 (1997) (presenting
studies examining people's anticipation of, actual experiences in, and subse-
quent recollection of three vacations: a trip to Europe, a Thanksgiving vacation,
and a three-week bicycle trip in California). But see Michael Ross & Qi Wang,
Why We Remember and What We Remember: Culture and Autobiographical
Memory, 5 PERSP. PSYCHOL. Sci. 401,405 (2010) ("East Asians who retrospec-
tively downplay their positive emotional experiences might revive their earlier
enjoyment by revisiting past places that they remember with some fondness.").
255. Derrick Wirtz et al., What to Do on Spring Break? The Role of Predicted, On-
Line, and Remembered Experience in Future Choice, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. 520
(2003) (suggesting that even though on-line measures could approximate ob-
jective experience better than retrospective measures, retrospective measures
can better predict choice behavior).
256. Id.
257. Hakkyun Kim et al., Will This Trip Really Be Exciting? The Role of Incidental
Emotions in Product Evaluation, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 983 (2010).
258. Id.
259. See generally Kahneman, Experience vs. Memory, supra note 11.
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An intuition that some people may desire more than just anticipated
memories is viscerally illustrated in Total Recall,260 a popular film based on
Philip K. Dick's science-fiction novelette, We Can Remember it for You
Wholesale.261 In the film, characters debate about purchasing the services of
Rekal Incorporated, a company that provides implanted false memories of
ideal virtual vacations.262
Despite the expected and inevitable hassles of travel, many people pre-
fer to actually experience a vacation, and anticipate having fond memories of
it. Thoughts of bonding, shared experiences, and fond memories may also
motivate choices regarding traveling companions and destinations. In other
words, some people believe that sometimes, vacations can transform relation-
ships with family, friends, and even people who previously were strangers. 63
Furthermore, many people undertake certain experiences because they hope
they will become different people, not just identical people with different
memories. This motivation is especially true for such transcendental emo-
tions as awe and wonder,264 which people often wish to share with family and
friends.65 These observations illustrate that people care not only about living
through certain experiences, but also about having incomplete, selective
memories of those experiences which they can then relive.
To view incompleteness of memory as a bias presumes an unattainable
normative benchmark of perfect recall,266 to which there are at least three
responses. First, documentation of so-called biases does not evidence a "cor-
relation with lower earnings, unhappiness, impaired health, inaccurate be-
260. TOTAL RECALL (TriStar Pictures 1990).
261. Philip K. Dick, We Can Remember it for You Wholesale, in THE COLLECTED
STORIES OF PHILIP K. DICK 35 (2002).
262. TOTAL RECALL, supra note 260.
263. Rebecca Webber, Big Moments, PSYCH. TODAY, Sept. 1, 2010, at 63, 64-69
(describing transformative nature of anticipations, experiences, and memories
of peak moments).
264. Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and
Aesthetic Emotion, 17 COGNITION & EMOTION 297 (2003) (analyzing awe and
such related states as admiration, elevation, and experiences of epiphany).
265. Jonathan Haidt, Hive Psychology, Happiness, and Public Policy, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133 (2008) (suggesting a focus on happy groups as being more than
collections of happy individuals); see also Rajagopal Raghunathan & Kim
Corfman, Is Happiness Shared Doubled and Sadness Shared Halved?: Social
Influence on Enjoyment of Hedonic Experiences, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 386,
388-93 (2006) (reporting on a pair of experiments showing how exposure to
other people's opinions affects people's enjoyment of shared experiences).
266. Nathan Berg, Behavioral Economics, in 2 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS: A REF-
ERENCE HANDBOOK 867 (Rhona C. Free ed., 2010) (utilizing "bias" label im-
plies existence of a normative benchmark).
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liefs, or shorter lives."267 Second, related heuristics studies show that "less
information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy [of re-
call]."268 Third, aggregate or social consequences of so-called biases can dif-
fer from individual consequences. 269 All three of these observations imply
that law can view-and have reasons to normatively treat-an individual's
memory differently than the individual does.
C. Hedonic Adaptation and Defective Affective Forecasting
"If you keep going over the past, you're going to end up with a thousand
pasts and no future."270
It is evolutionarily advantageous for us to hedonically adapt to certain
external conditions. Various empirical studies of hedonic adaptation show
our attention is a scarce resource, so our emotions direct our attention to
anything that causes us to feel emotional responses.2 71 Similar to imperfect
recall and incompleteness of memories, hedonic adaptation frees up people's
attention so they can focus it elsewhere when required for survival.72 "Fail-
ure to adapt would unnecessarily sap limited brain resources needed to per-
ceive new stimuli and, in the extreme case, bring about the extinction of the
species."273 Peter Medawar, 1960 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or
Medicine,274 and his wife Jean explain "[i]n a sense, all evolution is adapta-
tion."275 Both hedonic adaptation and partially forgetting experiences permit
267. Nathan Berg & Gerd Gigerenzer, As-If Behavioral Economics: Neoclassical
Economics in Disguise?, 18 HIST. ECON. IDEAS 133 (2010) (making this
observation).
268. Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds
Make Better Inferences, 1 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 107 (2009).
269. Nathan Berg & Gerd Gigerenzer, Psychology Implies Paternalism? Bounded
Rationality May Reduce the Rationale to Regulate Risk-Taking, 28 Soc.
CHOICE & WELFARE 337, 338-58 (2007) (demonstrating this formally in a the-
oretical model).
270. EL SECRETO DE sus Ojos, supra note 16, at 6.
271. See, e.g., Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel
Kahneman, Ed Diener, & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999).
272. Id.
273. Krzysztof Kontek, Two Kinds of Adaptation, Two Kinds of Relativity 6 (Sept.
19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1679447.
274. Peter Medawar-Facts, NOBEL MEDIA AB 2014 (Aug. 5, 2014), http://nobel
prize.org/nobel-prizes/medicine/laureates/1960/medawar-bio.html.
275. P. B. MEDAWAR & J. S. MEDAWAR, ARISTOTLE TO Zoos: A PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 1 (1983).
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us to move on in life.276 "Burying the past is therefore a prerequisite to exper-
iencing the present and the future."277
Scholars disagree on how knowledge of hedonic adaptation should af-
fect the legal system. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur point out previously
unrecognized benefits of lengthy delays in civil trials: plaintiffs are more
likely to settle and are motivated to settle for less than if their lawsuits were
to proceed faster.278 Swedloff criticizes their arguments concerning litiga-
tion's impacts on plaintiffs' adaptation and analyzes whether the judicial sys-
tem should encourage slower post-adaptation settlements, concluding that
data on hedonic adaptation may not yet be ready for "prime time" application
to settlements of civil litigation.279 Other considerations imply that empirical
hedonic adaptation findings are of limited relevance to analyzing tort plain-
tiffs' motivations.280 Many other emotions besides happiness motivate litiga-
tion.281 In fact, emotions in tort cases can be cultural evaluations,282 for
instance, tort plaintiffs' fear283 of losing their litigation options.284 Empirical
data concerning hedonic adaptation fails to undermine monetary damages
and jury awards for noneconomic harms in tort cases. 285
276. Kontek, supra note 273, at 6.
277. Id.
278. See generally John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of
Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008).
279. Rick Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 39, 44-45 (2008); see also Swedloff, supra note 84, at 804-06
(arguing that questions about the meaning of well-being and temporal differ-
ences in happiness raise important concerns about how relevant hedonic adap-
tation is to the law).
280. Peter H. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 50, 51-52 (2008).
281. E.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12
INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 31, 31-42 (1998) (analyzing such other emotions in
litigation as anger, disappointment, embarrassment, pride, and vengeance).
282. See Peter H. Huang, Diverse Conceptions of Emotions in Risk Regulation, 156
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUM BRA 435 (2008) (analyzing other conceptions of emo-
tions). See generally Dan Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regula-
tion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 748-52 (2008) (explaining how emotions can be
cultural evaluations).
283. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, supra note 280, at
51-52.
284. See also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275-80
(2006) (introducing and analyzing a real options model of litigation).
285. Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Hap-
piness, 85 IND. L.J. 553, 594 (2010).
[Vol. XVII
Torn Between Two Selves
Critics of the hedonist approach also argue that there are limitations to
the use of hedonic adaptation in forming public policy. Loewenstein and
physician Peter Ubel believe hedonic adaptation research casts grave doubts
upon enacting policy based just on self-reported happiness or experienced
affect.286 Similarly, philosopher Bengt Brulde believes that hedonic adapta-
tion demonstrates a danger to basing distributive strategies on happiness
data.287 Philosopher Joseph Heath concurs, emphasizing that we should "not
to get too carried away when sampling the happiness literature, particularly
with respect to adaptation . . . [and] there must be more . than merely a
concern with subjective well-being."288
Some scholars suggest that any public policy should pass a common-
sense test.289 Judgment and decision-making scholar Shane Frederick and
Loewenstein suggest considering these three questions:
Assuming that future research provides a deeper understanding of
hedonic adaptation, is it likely that such information would cause
people to conduct their lives differently? Would they stop wearing
seatbelts with the assurance that they would get used to being par-
alyzed? Would they exploit an embezzlement opportunity know-
ing that prison wouldn't be all that bad in the long run? We
suspect not.290
People can also disrupt hedonic adaptation by interrupting their exper-
iences. Although people seem annoyed by commercials interrupting televi-
sion programs, such interruptions actually make programs more enjoyable.291
This effect is eliminated for people who are less likely to adapt and for pro-
grams that do not lead to adaptation.292 This confirms a disruption of adapta-
tion and identifies crucial boundaries of this effect.293 Similar, perhaps
counterintuitive, phenomena occur across a variety of hedonic consumption
286. George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of
Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. EcON. 1795,
1799-1800 (2008) (noting that people make great sacrifices to avoid experienc-
ing negative circumstances despite knowing they will adapt).
287. Bengt Brulde, Happiness, Morality, and Politics, 11 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 567,
582 (2010).
288. Joseph Heath, Comment on Andreou, ETHICS, PLACE, & ENV'T 23, 25 (2010).
289. Levav, supra note 61, at 335.
290. Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 271, at 320.
291. E.g., Leif D. Nelson et al., Enhancing the Television-Viewing Experience
Through Commercial Interruptions, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 160 (2009) (present-
ing six studies demonstrating these findings are true, independent of commer-
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experiences ranging from sitting in a massage chair to listening to noises or
songs. Even though people avoid breaks in pleasant experiences and choose
breaks in unpleasant experiences, interruptions in a consumption experience
can disrupt hedonic adaptation and intensify subsequent experiences, making
pleasant experiences more enjoyable and unpleasant experiences more
irritating.294
People are prone to underestimate how much and how quickly they and
others can adapt hedonically.295 For example, healthy people underestimate
hedonic adaptation because they do not consider how and why their emotions
are likely to change over time following the onset of a disability or illness.296
People tend also to recall atypical instances of events; if unaware of this, they
rely on such atypical instances to make affective forecasts and choices about
future events. 297 But accuracy in affective forecasting is more complex than
mere overestimation of duration and intensity. When people opt out of a
risky gamble and instead make a safe bet, they actually underestimate instead
of overestimate their affective reactions.298
Overestimation of affective reactions to future choices and events-also
known as impact bias-is partially explained by well-documented focusing
illusions.99 Impact biases can be disrupted by cognitive tasks to reduce the
overestimation of their affective reactions to future events and decisions.300
For some people, focusing on peripheral events and recognizing coping ca-
pacity may improve their affective forecasting.301 In addition, people repeat-
edly focusing prior to an event can influence their subsequent happiness
294. Leif D. Nelson & Tom Meyvis, Interrupted Consumption: Adaptation and the
Disruption of Hedonic Experience, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 654 (2008) (presenting
six studies demonstrating these findings).
295. See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2007).
296. Peter Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and
Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57 (2005).
297. See generally Carey K. Morewedge et al., The Least Likely of Times: How
Remembering the Past Biases Forecasts of the Future, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 626
(2005).
298. Eduardo B. Andrade & Leaf Van Boven, Feelings Not Forgone: Underesti-
mating Affective Reactions to What Does Not Happen, 21 PSYCHOL. Scl. 706,
706-11 (2010).
299. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Nego-
tiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 817, 821-28 (2004) (discussing implications of im-
pact bias for negotiators).
300. Nick Sevdalis & Nigel Harvey, Reducing the Impact Bias in Judgments of
Post-Decisional Affect: Distraction or Task Interference?, 4 JUDGMENT & DE-
CISION MAKING 287, 288-95 (2009).
301. Michael Hoerger et al., Cognitive Determinants of Affective Forecasting Er-
rors, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 365, 371 (2010).
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ratings.302 The repeated focusing effect and difficulty of de-biasing the stud-
ies implies possible difficulties for interpreting subjective well-being data.303
III. CHRONIC HEALTH OR STRESS EFFECTS
This part of the article identifies conditions under which society, via
law, should care about people's experiences more than their memories. Al-
though legal proceedings are themselves experiences that usually entail nega-
tive affect,304 legal proceedings also involve memories of experiences that led
to such legal proceedings instead of those actual experiences themselves.
Civil and criminal prosecutions rely upon testimony about recollections of
experiences because lawsuits necessarily occur after whatever events led to
them.305 Law as expressed in model codes, judicial opinions, statutory regula-
tions, rules, subsidies, and taxes can focus upon people's experiences, memo-
ries, or both.
The law can and should consider people's memories when they hold
meaning to people, especially if those memories impinge on people's abili-
ties to live their lives. For example, a criminal defense involving post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD)306 focuses upon persistent and frightening
memories of a past experienced ordeal.307
Many activities that laws are designed to influence impact objective
consequences and subjective experiences for not only those who choose and
are intended targets of those activities, but also society at large. Such exter-
nalities, whether they are objective consequences upon or subjective exper-
iences of third parties, may be just as important as direct effects. They might
be even more crucial in terms of their expressive, public policy, signaling, or
spillover effects.
When objective consequences and subjective memories of experiences
differ in valence, law may care about objective consequences more than sub-
302. Paul Dolan & Robert Metcalfe, 'Oops ... I Did It Again': Repeated Focusing
Effects in Reports of Happiness, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 732, 733-35 (2010)
(showing that previous exposure to an ex ante survey of happiness and its at-
tendant focusing on an event may shape and influence ex post self-reported
happiness).
303. Id. at 735-36.
304. Huang & Wu, supra note 281, at 34-36 (analyzing how anger impacts pre-trial
bargaining).
305. See Laura Engelhardt, Comment, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony, I
Stan. J. Legal Stud. 25, 29 (1999).
306. See, e.g., KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CON-
TEMPORARY APPROACH 571-72 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 1st ed. 2005)
(analyzing legal issues relating to PTSD).
307. Id.
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jective memories of experiences for several reasons. 308 First, objective conse-
quences may vary less across people than subjective memories do because of
heterogeneity in people's emotional reactions to experiences and their memo-
ries.309 Second, although experiences with positive objective consequences
usually generate positive affective valence and correspondingly fond memo-
ries, experiences with negative objective consequences may nonetheless re-
sult in positive affect given enough time.310 This is due to partial hedonic
adaptation, which may yield positive memories due to incomplete and selec-
tive memories.
Third, if divergences between objective consequences and subjective
memories of experiences are due to incomplete hedonic adaptation or imper-
fect memories, it would be perverse for the law to discourage recovery from
negative affective experiences.31 It is normatively and socially desirable that
people heal hedonically from and forget about unpleasantness from nega-
tively affective experiences as much as they can. Simply because people
hedonically adapt and forget about unpleasant experiences does not imply
that the law should be correspondingly less concerned about those
experiences.312
Because experiences have a number of consequences, the law should
care about information more than incomplete self-reports of subjectively
remembered or experienced affect. This does not deny that the law can, does,
and should care about self-reports of experienced and remembered affect;
self-reports provide valuable information about what motivates the law.3'3
However, not all of that information holds equal value. It is possible that a
person's affective memories function as sufficient proxies of experienced af-
fect from that person's viewpoint, but not from a societal point of view. Le-
gal and social considerations including efficiency, equity, expectations,
externalities, ethics, fairness, justice, morality, and public policy are all
factors.314
In addition, societies may pursue laws that care about experienced affect
more than remembered affect to accomplish other particular goals. One pos-
sible set of legal and social objectives focus on expressive concerns, 315 such
308. Peter H. Huang, Experiences Versus Memories: Should Law and Policy Care
More about Your First Love or Your Memories of it? 54-55 (Nov. 3 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1743025.





314. Huang, Experiences Versus Memories, supra note 308, at 55-56.
315. See ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 17-43
(1995).
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as providing aspirations for how individuals and societies can and should
behave.316
A. Dense and Long Commutes
The law should care about experiences more than memories if those
repeated, chronic experiences adversely affect people's health or stress
levels. For example, legal interventions to reduce negative affective commut-
ing experiences can be justified by a paternalistic goal to reduce adverse
cumulative, detrimental, long-term health consequences. 317 But, legal inter-
ventions can also be justified by a social but not paternalistic goal to the
same end. Long, dense commutes result in negative affective contagion or
spillover effects; societal medical costs of treating back problems, high blood
pressure, mental anguish, neck strain, obesity, and physical stress. As law
professor Claire Hill observes, "In most paternalistic interventions, there are
externalities, and necessarily so."318
How people experience urban commutes depends on how they perceive
time and on various characteristics of their commutes, including duration,
journey episodes, number of stages, travel environment, and expectations.319
How commuters evaluate their experiences depends on those same character-
istics.320 For instance, American workers with long commutes are more likely
to self-report feeling fatigue, less enjoyment, high cholesterol, obesity, recur-
ring back or neck pain, and worry.32' One robust finding of empirical happi-
ness research is that people having longer commuting times consistently self-
report levels of lower subjective well-being.322
Psychologist Daniel Gilbert recommends that keeping one's commute
short increases happiness, observing that people "can't adapt to commuting,
because it's entirely unpredictable ... [d]riving in traffic is a different kind
316. See generally Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 101 (2004).
317. Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444, 452
(2007).
318. Id.
319. Yuen-wah Li, Evaluating the Urban Commute Experience: A Time Perception
Approach, 6 J. PuB. TRANSP. 41, 46-50, tbl. 1 (2003).
320. Id. at 50-55, tbl. 2.
321. See generally Steve Crabtree, Wellbeing Lower Among Workers with Long
Commutes, GALLUP (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/142142/well
being-lower-among-workers-long-commutes.aspx (reporting details of this
research).
322. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer?
A Focusing Illusion, 312 Sci. 1908, 1910, tbl. 4 (2006) (finding that commut-
ing is correlated with lower self-reported happiness and higher stress levels).
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of hell every day."323 Interestingly, most people's optimal commute times are
not zero. One survey found that respondents prefer a minimum commute of
twenty minutes to decompress and be free of home and work identities, en-
gage in singing, experience being an adolescent again,324 and listen to talk
radio, music, or audio books. People also use driving time to grieve in soli-
tude.325 Indeed, there can be some real advantages to long commutes. 326
1. Explaining Dense, Long Commutes
It is helpful to analyze how and why driving in traffic can be so misera-
ble. Numerous factors make urban driving an unpleasant experience: acci-
dents, buses, delays, lack of merging etiquette, lane closures, potholes, road
construction, other drivers' rudeness, speeding or very slow drivers, and
stop-and-go traffic.327 All of these minor annoyances, repeated over time, can
lead to chronic anger, anxiety, and stress, 328 which can have detrimental be-
havioral, biological, physiological, and psychological correlates.329
There is an environmental mismatch in that human beings and their bod-
ies evolved to handle infrequent short-term stresses such as running from
predators, but are not equipped for the chronic, constant, and repeated
stresses of long, dense commutes. 330 For instance, emotions aroused during
commuting likely also spill over into people's home and work lives due to
323. Jonathan Clements, Money and Happiness: Here's Why You Won't Laugh All
the Way to the Bank, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB 115568141441336604 (quoting psychologist Daniel Gilbert).
324. TOM VANDERBILT, TRAFFIC: WHY WE DRIVE THE WAY WE Do 26 (1st ed.
2004).
325. Id. at 26; see also Paul C. Rosenblatt, Grieving While Driving, 28 DEATH
STUD. 679, 680-85 (2004).
326. Kenneth Andrews, Advantages of a Long Commute to Work, CAREER PATH
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.careerpath360.com/index.php/advantages-of-a-
long-commute-to-work-2-795 1/.
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., REBECCA NERISON, LAWYERS, ANGER AND ANXIETY: DEALING WITH
THE STRESSES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1-13, 15-21, 42-49 (2010) (describ-
ing the physiology of stress and examining aspects of anger).
329. See generally ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON'T GET ULCERS (3d
ed., 2004) (explaining how the constant stresses of modem everyday life such
as driving in traffic jams harms our cardiovascular, digestive, reproductive, and
immune systems); see also RICHARD WILKINSON, THE IMPACT OF INEQUALITY:
How TO MAKE SICK SOCIETIES HEALTHIER 272-81 (2005) (outlining briefly
the biological effects of stress and how stress exerts a powerful effect on physi-
ological health); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL:
WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES STRONGER SOCIETIES 37-39, 86, 209 (2009)
(summarizing stress-related sources, biology, and diseases).
330. See generally SAPOLSKY, supra note 329.
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emotional contagion and incidental affect.331 People rate commuting as not
only unpleasant, but also less rewarding than almost all other activities.332
Drivers continuing to make dense, lengthy commutes, but simultane-
ously reporting increased stress and reduced life satisfaction, present a para-
dox.333 Why do these stressed out and unhappy individuals persist in dense,
long commutes? Several theories center around personal satisfaction factors.
One theory is that family members of commuters benefit, but such a hypothe-
sis is not supported by empirical data.334 A second possible answer is that
long commuters are compensated by homes or jobs they deem personally
more attractive, but such a hypothesis also does not have empirical sup-
port.335 A third possible answer is that transactions costs limit job and resi-
dential mobility; this offers only a partial explanation at best.336
Other theories favor behavioral explanations. For instance, one premise
is based upon people's defective affective forecasting.337 People's prefer-
ences are constructed by reference levels of commuting radius or time.338 For
example, one study of people moving from one American city to another
indicates that those from cities with high average commute times choose to
commute more than average in their new location.339 This research thus ex-
plains people commuting not only too much, but also too little.340 Another
possible answer is that people are weak-willed, which is also a partial expla-
nation at best.341
This article proposes that another possible reason for the commuting
paradox is people's unsurprisingly incomplete memories of commuting. Al-
bert Einstein said: "Any man who can drive safely while kissing a pretty girl
331. See generally Andrews, supra note 326.
332. White & Dolan, supra note 115, at 1002, 1005, 1007.
333. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress that Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Para-
dox, 110 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 339, 341-55 (2008) (presenting detailed
analysis of commuting costs in terms of physical and mental burdens and lower
reported life satisfaction levels).
334. Id. at 355-57, tbl. 3.
335. Id. at 357-58, tbl. 4 (showing that long commuters would have less stress if
they had less dense, shorter commutes while having the same homes or jobs as
they have now).
336. Id. at 358-61, tbl. 5.
337. See generally GILBERT, supra note 295.
338. Id. at 361-62.
339. See generally Uri Simonsohn, New-Yorkers Commute More Everywhere: Con-
trast Effects in the Field, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1-9 (2006) (noting that the
same is true of those with short commutes).
340. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 333, at 362.
341. Id.
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is simply not giving the kiss the attention it deserves."342 Drivers have diffi-
culties paying attention to traffic during commuting.343 Therefore, it seems
intuitively and logically plausible that drivers also should have difficulty re-
membering details about traffic. These difficulties likely increase over time
because details from any particular single commute fade into a sea of memo-
ries about commuting in general.
In addition, empirical happiness research indicates that happiness more
strongly correlates to duration and frequency of positive feelings rather than
those feelings' intensity.344 Just as parents do not dwell upon small but fre-
quent misery and stress of raising children,345 it seems plausible that drivers
with long or unpleasant commutes do not remember every minor annoyance,
frustration, indignity, and irritation they suffer on a regular basis.
Whether drivers remember such recurrent emotions from their long
commutes is an open empirical question whose answer likely varies across
people and commutes. But, well-documented phenomena of duration, neg-
lect, and evaluation according to a peak-end rule should apply to memories
of commuting experiences,346 and help explain why people find commuting
home less unpleasant than commuting to work. People may adaptively
neither dwell on remembering nor anticipating dense, long commutes if they
have no effective choice about where they live and work.
2. Experiences Versus Memories of Commutes
Should laws care more about people's actual unpleasant experiences or
about their incomplete but less unpleasant memories of dense, lengthy com-
mutes? Another way to think of this is to question whether incomplete com-
muting memories mean that people are not only individually, but also
socially, mistaken in making such commutes. In other words, do people who
make unpleasant, longer commutes impose negative externalities upon soci-
ety? Long commutes have familiar and well-documented socially undesirable
objective consequences, such as congestion and environmental damage. They
also have less well-recognized socially undesirable subjective consequences,
like negative affect contagion upon and spillover onto fellow commuters,
342. VANDERBILT, supra note 324, at 74 (analyzing research about difficulties of
paying attention in traffic).
343. Id. at 74-89.
344. See, e.g., Ed Diener et al., Happiness is the Frequency, Not the Intensity, of
Positive Versus Negative Affect, in ASSESSING WELL-BEING: THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ED DIENER 3: 213, 213-30 (Ed Diener ed., 2009); see also Ulrich
Schimmack & Ed Diener, Affect Intensity: Separating Intensity and Frequency
in Repeatedly Measured Affect, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1313,
1315-28 (1997).
345. Nattavudh Powdthavee, Think Having Children Will Make You Happier?, 22
PSYCHOL. 308, 309-10 (2009).
346. See, e.g., Li, supra note 319, at 53-54 (explaining these applications).
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commuters' households and their work colleagues when those groups have to
deal with stressed-out commuters in bad moods.
Consider an analogy and the relevant differences between commuting
and parenting. Powdthavee points out, "[r]aising children is probably the
toughest and the dullest job in the world."347 Commuting usually is neither as
dull nor as tough as (mundane or difficult aspects of) parenting, but can in-
volve similar types of loss of control, stress, and unpredictability.
Powdthavee observes that it should be "no surprise to us that these negative
experiences that come with parenthood will show up much more often in our
subjective experiences, including happiness and life satisfaction, than activi-
ties that are, although rewarding, relatively rare."348 Similarly, it should be
obvious that commuting's negative affect and experiences resonate louder in
commuters' subjective experiences than any relatively rare positive affect
and experiences, such as random acts of kindness or politeness in commut-
ing.349 A key difference between commuting and parenting becomes apparent
upon comparing the infrequent delights of commuting with the frequent and
recurring-if not daily delights-of parenting.350
Shouldn't the wellbeing hit from a higher but less frequent quality
experience with our children be larger than-or, at the very least,
equal to-the small but more frequent misery that raising children
can bring? .. .[W]e tend to believe that the rare but meaningful
experiences-such as seeing our children smile for the first time
or graduating from university or getting married-would give us
massive increases in our happiness. And indeed they do, but these
boosts in well-being, often to our surprise, tend not to last for very
long.351
He explains that a reason people are prone to focusing on illusions about
positive experiences "lies in the nature of these experiences. How often do
347. Powdthavee, supra note 345, at 310.
348. Id.
349. See ED DIENER ET AL., WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 150-54 (Christopher
Peterson ed., 2009).
350. S. Katherine Nelson et al., The Pains and Pleasures of Parenting: When, Why,
and How is Parenthood Associated with More or Less Well-Being?, 140
PSYCHOL. BULL. 846.(2014) (presenting a model of parents' well-being that
explains how and why parents experience more or less happiness than
nonparents); S. Katherine Nelson et al., In Defense of Parenthood: Children
are Associated with More Joy Than Misery, 24 PSYCHOL. Sci. 3 (2013) (report-
ing on three studies finding that parents report relatively higher levels of happi-
ness, positive emotion, and meaning in life than do nonparents).
351. Powdthavee, supra note 345, at 309.
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we think about these rare but meaningful experiences on a day-to-day basis if
we are not prompted to think about them?"352
All of these observations about parenting also explain why experiences
of negative affect from commuting outweigh any positive commuting exper-
iences. However, people with dense, long commutes are presumably not just
suffering from a focusing illusion about rare, meaningful positive affect from
commuting. Instead, a more likely possibility is that people do not focus on
the unpleasantness when they remember or anticipate such commutes. They
are essentially undergoing an illusion entailing a failure to focus on the eve-
ryday negative affect due to long commutes.
Powdthavee asks, "[W]hat if we do not give in to this comfortable illu-
sion? What if all of us decided one day-for the sake of our own personal
happiness-not to have children any more [sic]? The chances are that the
future [would] stop at our generation."353 However, a similar question about
commuting does not lead to such an apocalyptic outcome. Instead, if people
focused more on how unpleasant long, dense commutes are, they might
change their commuting behavior.354 If changing one's commute, employ-
ment, or home is not practical, then an individual is fortunate to have a com-
muting illusion.
3. Possible Social Responses to Dense and Long Commutes
The commuting paradox may continue because people's anticipations
about and memories of commuting are more pleasant and selective in com-
parison to actual complete and unpleasant experiences of long, dense com-
mutes. However, society should care about the cumulative, adverse health
consequences due to commuting stress more than people's incomplete affec-
tive memories and imperfect emotional anticipations associated with com-
muting. The law should care more about people's repeated dense, long
commuting experiences rather than people's incomplete memories of them
because such experiences have long-term deleterious health consequences
and produce negative emotional and environmental externalities.355 A large
body of empirical and experimental evidence demonstrates that long car and
train commutes are correlated with a lower overall quality of life.356
352. Id. at 309.
353. Id. at 310.
354. DIENER ET AL., supra note 349, at 154.
355. Id. at 150-54.
356. Id. (analyzing, detailing, and surveying large number of studies demonstrating
that long, dense commutes correlate to decreased attention, cardiovascular out-
comes, frustration tolerance, health, life satisfaction, job satisfaction, job stabil-
ity, mood, motivation, overall subjective well-being, proofreading
performance, task persistence, and time spent on more enjoyable activities, in
addition to increased cortisol, stress, and work absences).
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But the fact that dense, long commutes are stressful, unpleasant, and
unrewarding does not imply that all government policies and regulations are
necessarily socially desirable or even good ideas based on sound economic
and psychological foundations. For example, constructing more free lanes to
relieve congestion is a bad idea because additional free lanes and roads only
result in more traffic.357 In addition, even though searching for parking in
most urban centers is often frustrating and stressful, providing more free
parking spaces is an ill-advised policy that imposes high social costs and
externalities upon communities and our environment.358 However, municipal-
ities charging developers in-lieu fees and drivers for curb parking can also
relieve parking congestion.359 Similarly, congestion pricing360 and provision
of real-time congestion and/or routing information offer promise to relieve
traffic congestion.361
A number of government policies could reduce commuting, including
appropriate design of public transportation; education about commuting's
negative consequences on people's health and society at large, and urban
planning to integrate business and residential neighborhoods via zoning regu-
lations.362 Other related proposals advocate increasing parks and green spaces
near where people live and work, based on empirical and experimental stud-
ies demonstrating the well-being benefits of contact with nature.363 One com-
prehensive guide explains how land use lawyers, urban planners, and public
officials can implement umbrella sustainable growth systems to improve the
quality of life, revitalize neighborhoods, reduce air pollution, conserve land,
and combat climate change.364
Urban economist Edward L. Glaeser argues that government policies
such as building restrictions, oversupply of public infrastructure, zoning reg-
ulations, and subsidized automobile travel and home ownership have made
357. VANDERBILT, supra note 324, at 153-61 (analyzing problems caused by addi-
tional free roads).
358. See generally DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 1-227
(2011) (providing a landmark analysis of problems caused by free parking).
359. Id. at 231-32 (analyzing possible solutions to problems due to providing free
parking).
360. See generally William S. Vickrey, Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 452, 457-65 (1963) (proposing congestion pricing).
361. VANDERBILT, supra note 324, at 161-75 (analyzing possible solutions to
problems of traffic congestion).
362. DIENER ET AL., supra note 349, at 154.
363. Id. at 154-57.
364. See generally ROBERT H. FREILICH ET AL., FROM SPRAWL TO SUSTAINABILITY:
SMART GROWTH, NEW URBANISM, GREEN DEVELOPMENT, AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY (2d ed. 2010) (defining these systems as a combination of green devel-
opment, new urbanism, renewable energy, and smart growth).
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city living less accessible than it should be.365 He advocates that government
should discourage urban sprawl and commuting by promoting dense urban-
ization.366 Another theory suggests that cities in California, Nevada, Arizona,
and Florida that have suffered economic decline due to the recent housing
bust and recession can pursue smart shrinkage that encourages more green
spaces, public transportation, and walking.367
Furthermore, private parties, such as employers, can provide comple-
ments or substitutes to government policies and regulations to improve peo-
ple's well-being at work,368 including reducing dense and lengthy commutes.
Enlightened employers can permit or actively encourage more telecommut-
ing and should do so upon recognizing the economic, emotional, mental, and
physical costs they incur on employees.369 In conjunction with governments,
employers can subsidize carpooling and help transform public transportation
into a positive experience by utilizing such design considerations as color,
connection to place, economic revitalization, form, headway, lighting, opera-
tion, pace, route, scaling, seating, social opportunity, style, and
transparency. 370
B. Obesity
The World Health Organization defines being obese as having a mea-
sure of body fat based on height and weight, known as the Body Mass Index
(BMI), of greater than thirty.371 Most people would likely report that being
obese is an unpleasant experience and their memories of being obese are
negative.372 A large part of such negative affect from both experiences and
memories of being obese are due to guilt, shame, and stigma that are socially
365. See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: How OUR GREAT-
EST INVENTION MAKES Us RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAP-
PIER (2011).
366. Id.
367. See JUSTIN B. HOLLANDER, SUNBURNT CITIES: THE GREAT RECESSION, DEPOP-
ULATION AND URBAN PLANNING IN THE AMERICAN SUNBELT 117 (2011).
368. TOM RATH & JIM HARTER, WELLBEING: THE FIVE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
15-29, 187-94 (2010) (providing details and references conceming importance
of people's well-being at work as compared to people's overall well-being).
369. Crabtree, supra note 321.
370. See generally DARRIN NORDAHL, My KIND OF TRANSIT: RETHINKING PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION IN AMERICA 123-25 (2008) (analyzing past, present, and fu-
ture of American public transportation).
371. Health Topics Obesity, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/
topics/obesity/en! (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
372. Alois Stutzer, Limited Self-Control, Obesity and the Loss of Happiness, 15
INST. STUD. LAB. [IZA] Discussion Paper No. 2925, 2007) (Ger.) (finding em-
pirically that obesity decreases self-reported well-being of people who also
self-report limited self-control).
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associated with obesity.373 Even though people find neither experiences nor
memories of being obese to be positive, people nonetheless often become
obese despite a desire not to be SO. 374 Such unintended consequences often
result from people over-engaging in experiences which usually lead to posi-
tive affect and memories, such as eating comfort food, and under-engaging in
experiences which can produce short-term negative but long-term positive
affect, such as moderate to vigorous physical exercise.375
There are many different explanations for what causes obesity and its
recently increasing levels in the United States and many other developed
countries.376 A recent alternative socio-economic model that explains obesity
and its recent increase377 draws upon medical evidence that weight changes
are not strictly determined by net calorie consumption, but instead by what
foods people eat and how those foods influence such hormones as insulin and
effect the hormonal balance.378 Attempts to change one's lifestyle involve
behavioral, cognitive, emotional, financial, psychological, and time costs. 379
An economic model, in which people who would like to modify their behav-
ior face adjustment costs, mathematically proves that policy measures can
raise individual welfare by focusing on: (1) reducing incidence of excessive
consumption and leisure, and/or (2) facilitating behavioral change.380 Behav-
ior-focused studies find that these activities are correlated with an increased
probability of losing weight and keeping it off; adopting clear, modest goals;
373. See David S. Krantz et al., Health Psychology, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 349,
368 ( ).
374. See generally id. at 368-69.
375. Id.
376. See, e.g., Sara N. Bleich et al., Why is the Developed World Obese?, 29 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 273 (2008) (estimating relative contribution of increased
caloric intake and reduced physical activity to obesity in developed countries);
Eric A. Finkelstein, et al., Economic Causes and Consequences of Obesity, 26
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 239 (2005) (examining underlying economic causes
behind, economic consequences of, and role of government in combating obes-
ity); Odelia Rosen, The Economic Causes of Obesity, 22 J. ECON. SURV. 617
(2008) (surveying empirical and theoretical literature about economic and non-
economic causes of obesity).
377. John F. Tomer, What Causes Obesity? And Why Has it Grown So Much?, 54
CHALLENGE 22, 26-29 (2012).
378. See generally MARK HYMAN, ULTRAMETABOLISM: THE SIMPLE PLAN FOR Au-
TOMATIC WEIGHT Loss (2006); GARY TAUBES, WHY WE GET FAT: AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT (2011); GARY TAUBES, GOOD CALORIES, BAD CALORIES:
FATS, CARBS, AND THE CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE OF DIET AND HEALTH (2008).
379. See, e.g., Krantz et al., supra note 373, at 373-74.
380. Heather Bednarek et al., Gluttony and Sloth: Symptoms of Trouble or Signs of
Bliss? A Theory of Choice in the Presence of Behavioral Adjustment Costs, 5
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 24-26 (2006).
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focusing on lifelong habits; measuring initial weight and determining what
rituals and routines are contributing to overeating and/or under-exercising;
making small changes in behavior; measuring and recording one's body
weight, calories eaten, and steps taken; and joining support groups. 38'
This part of the article briefly considers three related, but distinct, corre-
lates of being obese; namely too much unhealthy eating, too little physical
exercise, and too much sedentary behavior, especially sitting time; and some
possible legal responses. To help individuals change their behavior, mere
disclosure or provision of information about biological, health, and stress
effects of experiences is not enough; instead, law has to engage people's
emotions to motivate them to want to change.382
1. Overeating and Unhealthy Eating
Humans evolved to anticipate and feel pleasure from experiences and
memories such as eating and sex, which facilitate their survival and repro-
duction. However, overeating, unhealthy diets, and sex addiction are mal-
adaptive. An obvious way to reduce overeating and poor nutrition is to make
experiences and memories of overeating and unhealthy eating less pleasant.
While this seems reasonable, Lowenstein and behavioral economist Ted
O'Donoghue warn that a danger of trying to control overeating via negative
affect is that people may fail to control their overeating and thus experience
the negative emotions of guilt and shame.383 In some cases, people may de-
velop neurotic attitudes about eating in addition to suffering adverse material
objective consequences from overeating.384
An alternative approach to curb these bad behaviors is to transform the
paradigm of "food as health" into "food as well-being." To enact this change,
society must shift from emphasizing restraint and restrictions to encouraging
a holistic and more positive understanding of how food can fit into a person's
overall well-being.385 Cultural, environmental, and legal changes may help
societies develop more positive emotional, physical, psychological, and so-
cial relationships with food.386
In addition, society can design policies that not only transform food-
related experiences, but also influence memories of past food experiences.
381. David H. Freedman, How to Fix the Obesity Crisis, Sci. AM., Feb. 2011, at 40.
382. See generally CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, SWITCH: How TO CHANGE THINGS
WHEN CHANGE Is HARD (2010); http://heathbrothers.com/books/switch/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2014).
383. See generally George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the
Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation and the Law,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2006).
384. See generally id.
385. Lauren G. Block et al., From Nutrients to Nurturance: A Conceptual Introduc-
tion to Food Well-Being, 30 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 5 (2011).
386. Id.
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For example, a recent study of non-dieting females of unexceptional weight
found that those who ate while watching television had less accurate memo-
ries of their food intake and ate more during a later, television-free meal.387
This research suggests that eating while watching television affects people's
memories about how much they ate, causing them to eat more later on. 388
People overeat for myriad reasons. People often eat more than they
think because they eat mindlessly instead of mindfully.389 Thus, one legal and
policy response to people overeating and eating unhealthily is to encourage
mindful eating.390 People also eat when they are sad, to self-medicate, and
when they are happy, to celebrate. A recent study found that both stress and
emotional eating are related to people overestimating their aggregate food
consumption.391 Thus, another legal and policy response to this would be to
foster non-emotional eating and to reduce stress in general.
Finally, laws should help children develop life-long, mindful, and
healthy eating habits because people learn many eating practices early in life
from their parents, siblings, and peers.392 For example, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture recently proposed a rule to raise nutrition standards of school
meals by limiting calories, french fries, and sodium and offering more fruits
and vegetables.393
C. Regular Physical Exercise
While most people understand that regular physical exercise has some
health benefit, they might not know about the antidepressant and stress-re-
ducing effects of physical exercise. There is a large and growing body of
387. Dolly Mittal et al., Snacking While Watching TV Impairs Food Recall and Pro-
motes Food Intake on a Later TV Free Test Meal, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 871 (2011).
388. Id. at 876.
389. See generally BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN
WE THINK (2006), available at http://www.mindlesseating.org/.
390. See, e.g., Jan Chozen Bays, Mindful Eating: The French Paradox, PSYCH. To-
DAY, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mindful-eating/200903/mindful-
eating-the-french-paradox (discussing eating less but enjoying it more) (last
visited Aug. 6, 2014).
391. Justin D. Royal & Jaime L. Kurtz, I Ate What?! The Effect of Stress and Dispo-
sitional Eating Style on Food Intake and Behavioral Awareness, 49 PERSONAL-
ITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 565, 568 (2010) (presenting experimental
details).
392. See, e.g., Jan Chozen Bays, Mindful Eating: The French Paradox Part 2,
PSYCH. TODAY, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mindful-eating/201002/
the-french-paradox-part-2 (describing teaching children mindful eating) (last
visited Aug. 6, 2014).
393. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Pro-
grams, 76 Fed. Reg. 2494 (Jan. 13, 2011).
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research that shows aerobic exercise not only improves attention, brain func-
tion, cognitive learning, and mood, but also reduces anxiety and stress.394
Even doing single bouts of resistance exercise (which unlike aerobic exercise
does not increase oxygen use), such as push-ups, sit-ups, and weightlifting,
can enhance people's episodic memory. 395 People may offer many different
reasons for not engaging in regular physical exercise activity, including lack
of time, money, inconvenience, and negative affect from physical exertion.
Yet, walking is a low-cost, usually convenient, and often pleasant form of
exercise. People's style of walking affects their affective memories and
moods.396 Societies could provide more public spaces, such as parks, tracks,
and indoor facilities, where people could safely walk and do other types of
regular physical exercise.
Technology has made exercise accessible in a whole new way. On pop-
ular video game consoles, such as the Nintendo Wii, PlayStation74, or Xbox
One, people can play physically active video games. For instance, exercise
video games can transform regular physical exercise activity into a more
pleasant and meaningful experience.397 Public and private health insurance
plans could promote more regular physical exercise by subsidizing the
purchase and, more importantly, but harder to monitor and verify, regular
utilization of physically active video games, gym memberships, and other
exercise equipment.
1. Sedentary Behavior and Sitting Time
Sedentary behavior is behavior that expends a very low amount of en-
ergy. 398 Examples of sedentary behavior include lying down, sitting when
driving, working on a computer, and watching television. Recent studies of-
394. See generally JOHN J. RATEY, SPARK: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW SCIENCE OF
EXERCISE AND THE BRAIN (2008); see also Austin, supra note 14, at 829-34
(discussing neuroscientific details).
395. Lisa Weinberg et al., A Single Bout of Resistance Exercise Can Enhance Epi-
sodic Memory Performance, 153 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 13 (2014).
396. Johannes Michalak et al., How We Walk Affects What We Remember: Gait
Modification through Biofeedback Change Negative Affective Bias, 46 J.
BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 121 (2015); Elizabeth Arm-
strong Moore, The Way You Walk Can Change Your Mood, USA TODAY, Dec.
9, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2O14/12/09/way-you-walk-can-
change-mood/20133681/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (reporting on this study);
Christie Nicholson, Bouncy Gait Improves Mood, Sd. AM., Dec. 8, 2014, http:/
/www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/bouncy-gait-improves-mood/
(last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (same).
397. Jeremy M. Zoss, Study: EA Sports Actives Is an Effective Workout, JOYSTICK
DIVISION, http://www.joystickdivision.con2010/06/study-ea-sports-activeis
_an-e.php (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
398. Neville Owen et al., Environmental Determinants of Physical Activity and Sed-
entary Behavior, 28 EXERCISE & SPORT Sci. REV. 153 (2000).
[Vol. XVII
Torn Between Two Selves
fer epidemiological evidence that sitting time has harmful cardiovascular and
metabolic effects,399 which are independent of whether people meet physical
activity recommendations.400 In fact, an individual can meet current sug-
gested levels of physical activity, but still be sedentary.01 In other words,
"sitting too much is not the same as lack of exercise and, as such, has its own
unique metabolic consequences."402 Researchers proposed a term, inactivity
physiology, to describe potential causal roles of sedentary behaviors in devel-
opment of cardiovascular and metabolic diseases.403
A number of epidemiological studies conclude that sedentary time is
correlated with cardiometabolic risk, obesity, and even some cancers. 404 For
example, an Australian longitudinal study found that each hour of daily tele-
vision viewing,405 which is the predominant leisure-time sedentary behavior,
is associated with an eleven percent increase in the risk of all-cause mortality
independent of an individual's age, gender, physical activity level, and waist
circumference.406
399. Marc T. Hamilton et al., Role of Low Energy Expenditure and Sitting in Obes-
ity, Metabolic Syndrome, Type 2 Diabetes, and Cardiovascular Disease, 56
DIABETES 2655 (2007).
400. Marc T. Hamilton et al., Too Little Exercise and Too Much Sitting: Inactivity
Physiology and the Need for New Recommendations on Sedentary Behavior, 2
CURRENT CARDIOVASCULAR RISK REP. 292 (2008).
401. Id. at 293-94.
402. Id. at 294.
403. Marc T. Hamilton et al., Exercise Physiology Versus Inactivity Physiology: An
Essential Concept for Understanding Lipoprotein Lipase Regulation, 32 EXER-
CISE & SPORT Sci. REV. 161 (2004).
404. See generally Mark Stephen Tremblay et al., Physiological and Health Impli-
cations of a Sedentary Lifestyle, 35 APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY, NUTRITION, & ME-
TABOLISM 725 (2010) (reviewing these studies).
405. See generally David W. Dunstan et al., Television Viewing Time and Mortality:
The Australian Diabetes, Obesity and Lifestyle Study (AusDiab), 121 CIRCULA-
TION 384 (2010).
406. People that watch a lot of television also report less life satisfaction, more anxi-
ety, and increased material aspirations. See generally Bruno S. Frey et al., Does
Watching TV Make Us Happy?, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 283 (2007); BRUNO S.
FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 93-105 (2008); see also
Luigino Bruni & Luca Stanca, Income Aspirations, Television and Happiness:
Evidence from the World Values Survey, 59 KYKLos 209 (2006). People also
self-report watching television to be among the least pleasant, in terms of ex-
perienced negative affect, leisure activities. But see Erik Hurst, Thoughts on
"National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life", in MEASURING THE SUB-
JECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS 234, tbl. 8.1, 235-36 (Alan B. Krueger ed.,
2009) (suggesting that it should be unsurprising that people sometimes report
experiencing negative affect from watching television because people often
watch television fully expecting the possibility of negative affect, as when
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Another study found that the relationship between sitting time and mor-
tality does not depend on physical activity levels.407 Even after controlling
for age, physical activity levels, and smoking, people who sat the most were
roughly fifty percent more likely to die during the follow-up period than
people who sat the least.408 In fact, the relationship between sitting time and
mortality was also independent of BMI.409 These findings suggest that all
factors being equal-age, alcohol intake, body weight, gender, physical ac-
tivity levels, and smoking-a person who sits more has a higher risk of death
than a person who sits less.410
Finally, a recent study of ethnically diverse American adults found that
independent of exercise time, prolonged amounts of sedentary time is associ-
ated with negative health consequences, including bigger waists, higher
blood pressure, higher triglyceride levels, increased levels of C-reactive pro-
tein (an inflammatory marker associated with increased risk of coronary
heart disease and vascular mortality), and lower levels of good cholesterol.41"
These findings suggest that to prevent chronic disease, law should not only
promote regular physical exercise, but also focus on reducing sitting time,
especially prolonged television viewing.
The composition of that sedentary time can also influence physical well-
being.412 A study found that regardless of total sedentary time and total activ-
ity time, people who took more breaks while at work or watching television
had lower BMI and waist circumference. Additionally, those who took more
breaks enjoyed better metabolic health in terms of lower blood lipids and
glucose tolerance.43 It is worth emphasizing that people in this study took
breaks that were brief (less than five minutes) and of low intensity (just
standing or walking to a washroom).414
watching a sporting event in support of a favorite team likely to lose, or pre-
cisely to experience negative emotions, such as from a sad or scary program).
407. Peter T. Katzmarzyk et al., Sitting Time and Mortality from All Causes, Car-
diovascular Disease, and Cancer, 41 MED. & ScI. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE 998
(2009); see also Are You Sitting Too Much? (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=uiKg6JfS658.
408. Id. at 1002, tbl. 3.
409. Id. at 1001.
410. Id. at 1002.
411. See generally Genevieve N. Healy et al., Sedentary Time and Cardio-Meta-
bolic Biomarkers in US Adults: NHANES 2003-06, 32 EURO. HEART J. 590
(2011).
412. See generally Genevieve N. Healy et al., Breaks in Sedentary Time: Beneficial
Associations with Metabolic Risk, 31 DIABETES CARE 661 (2008).
413. Id.
414. See id. at 662.
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There is also further supporting evidence that, independent of overall
sedentary time, breaks in sedentary time are beneficially associated with the
inflammatory marker C-reactive protein, fasting plasma glucose, and waist
circumference.415 This research shows how important it is to avoid prolonged
uninterrupted periods of sedentary-mainly sitting time-and supports pub-
lic health recommendations which encourage physical activity.416 If people
are aware of their posture, then public health recommendations about not
being sedentary might be most effective if they utilize terminology focusing
on posture, such as: "Be aware of your posture throughout the day: sit less,
stand more!"417 Even if people are unaware of their posture, there are practi-
cal take-aways from this research.
[E]ven small changes to a person's activity levels (as little as
standing up regularly) might help to lower cardiovascular risk.
These changes can be readily incorporated into the person's day-
to-day life (including the work environment). Stand up, move
more, more often, could be used as a slogan to help get this mes-
sage across. 41 8
In short, in modern Western societies, people's schools, commutes, and
jobs all too often involve a lot of sitting time. There are a number of ratio-
nales for and challenges to schools promoting physical activity.419 Develop-
mental molecular biologist John Medina suggests having students walk one
to two miles per hour on treadmills instead of sitting at desks in class-
rooms. 420 Public schools could experiment with this concept by replacing
classroom desks with treadmills. Medina also suggests that companies re-
place desks in office cubicles with treadmills and notes that Boeing's vice
president of leadership installed a treadmill in her office.421 In fact, Dr. James
415. Healy et al., supra note 411 (noting data from a large, multi-ethnic, population-
based representative sample).
416. See generally Russell R. Pate et al., Physical Activity and Public Health: A
Recommendation from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
American College of Sports Medicine, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 402 (1995).
417. Hamilton et al., supra note 400, at 296.
418. Alan Mozes, Taking Short Breaks from Sitting May Help Waistline and Heart,
HEALTHDAY, Jan. 12, 2011, http://consumer.healthday.com/fitness-informa
tion- 14/misc-health-news-265/taking-short-breaks-from-sitting-may-help-waist
line-and-heart-648761.html (interviewing Genevieve N. Healy).
419. Andrew P. Hills et al., Supporting Public Health Priorities: Recommendations
for Physical Education and Physical Activity Promotion in Schools, PROGRESS
IN CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES (forthcoming 2014).
420. JOHN MEDINA, BRAIN RULES: 12 PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVING AND THRIVING AT
WORK, HOME, AND SCHOOL 25-26 (2008).
421. Id. at 26.
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A. Levine of the Mayo Clinic created and designed a "Treadmill Desk" spe-
cifically for these purposes. 22
D. Financial and Retirement Planning
Household management is an activity with one of the highest U-index
levels, which measures the fraction of time that people spend experiencing
unpleasant emotions.423 This empirical data reflects the reality that people
find managing their households to be affectively stressful and painful. Law
should care about household management having negative affect because
people are likely to engage in poor financial and retirement planning behav-
ior due to procrastination and rushing through household management to
minimize the unpleasantness.
For instance, taxbrain.com, which promises to "make taxes less taxing,"
suggests that society should strive to make financial and retirement planning
less affectively painful.424 This goal can be accomplished by subsidizing fi-
nancial advice and financial planning software, such as Economic Security
Planner425 and Financial Engines.26 The law can help make financial and
retirement decision-making more automatic, effortless, painless, and simple
for individuals. Stanford tax law professor Joseph Bankman not only advo-
cates utilizing technology to simplify personal income tax filing,427 he also
co-authored a California bill to create ReadyReturn,428 which is a completed
tax return prepared by the state.429
422. TREADMILL DESK GEEKS: ALL WALK, SOME TALK, http://www.treadmill-desk
.com/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2014); see also NBC Today Show: Desk Workout:
Treadmills at the Office (June 24, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wb
MTrboKbwU.
423. Alan B. Krueger et al., National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, MEA-
SURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF
TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 44, 46-47, tbls. 1.8 & 1.9 (Alan B. Krueger ed.,
2009).
424. We're Helping to Make Paying Uncle Sam Less Taxing, (Sept. 21, 2014, 8:30
PM), TAXBRAIN.COM, https://tbI0.taxbrain.com/whytaxbrain.asp.
425. See generally LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & SCOTT BURNS, SPEND 'TIL THE END:
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUIDE TO RAISING YOUR LIVING STANDARDCTODAY
AND WHEN YOU RETIRE (2008).
426. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. JONES, THE INTELLIGENT PORTFOLIO: PRACTI-
CAL WISDOM ON PERSONAL INVESTING FROM FINANCIAL ENGINES (2008).
427. See generally Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax
Filing, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 773 (2008).
428. Ready Return, http://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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IV. CONCLUSION
"There are those who look at things the way they are, and ask why ... I
dream of things that never were, and ask why not."430In conclusion, recon-
sider the question this article poses about whether the law should care more
about experiencing selves or remembering selves. People typically care more
about memories than experiences because they can only directly access
memories, which are incomplete and selective versions of experiences. In
reminiscing, people effectively can indirectly access past experiences via
current memories. Memories are thus like imperfect and self-edited copies of
experiences.431
People often romanticize memories compared with actual experiences.
This romanticism, combined with having memories that are rosier-colored
than experiences, implies that people will not only care more about memories
than experiences, but also that people will think more positively about mem-
ories than experiences. Because people base litigation decisions and policy
lobbying efforts upon memories instead of experiences, law generally cares
more about memories than experiences.
This article answers that question as follows: the law should care more
about experiencing selves than remembering selves if and when experiences
result in chronic health or stress consequences that either (1) society cares
about more than people do for public policy reasons or (2) people also care
about, but are unaware of, do not remember, or are unable to act upon (due to
self-control problems).
In general, experiencing selves and remembering selves are both impor-
tant and therefore should matter to law. For example, parents can and should
care about not only their children's childhood experiences, but also about
their children's memories as they age. However, there are many activities
where the law may choose to favor people's memories of experiences over
their actual experiences, such as being married, being a parent, owning a
home, and suburban living. Differences between how people experience and
remember home ownership,432 marriage,433 parenting,434 and suburban life435
430. This quote is attributed to Robert F. Kennedy in his brother Edward's eulogy
speech as: "Some men see things as they are and say why? I dream things that
never were and say why not?" Robert Kennedy said that he was quoting
George Bernard Shaw when he said this, but Robert Kennedy is often believed
to have originated this quote, which actually paraphrases this line "You see
things; and you say, 'Why?' But I dream things that never were; and I say,
'Why not?"' Edward Kennedy, Eulogy for Robert F. Kennedy (June 8, 1968),
(transcript available at www.americanrhetoric.com); see also GEORGE BER-
NARD SHAW, BACK TO METHUSELAH: A METABIOLOGICAL PENTATEUCH 67
(1988) (1921).
431. CERTIFIED COPY (CoPIE CONFORME) (IFC Films 2011) (raising the question of
whether a copy of something can ever be just as good as the original thing).
432. See generally Luis Diaz-Serrano, Disentangling the Housing Satisfaction Puz-
zle: Does Homeownership Really Matter?, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 745, 751-55
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raise positive questions about whether people care more about such exper-
iences or memories of them. These differences between people's experiences
and memories also raise normative questions about whether the law should
privilege people's incomplete memories of such experiences.
In addition, questions arise about whether the law should care about,
and deal with, empirical data indicating that although people accurately fore-
cast affective valence of their experiences, people are systematically inaccu-
rate in overestimating not only duration and intensity of affect,436 but also the
importance of comparative value.437
Albert Einstein once said, "[t]he only reason for time is so that every-
thing doesn't happen at once."438 William James wisely quipped that if peo-
ple were to have complete recall, then, "It would take as long for us to recall
a space of time as it took the original time to elapse, and we should never get
ahead with our thinking."439 A consequence of time is that any experience
has temporal antecedents in terms of anticipations and anticipatory emotions
and temporal successors in terms of memories and emotional reactions to
memories.
Any experience is just part of how that experience affects our lives due
to impacts of expectations before an experience and recollections after it. A
(2009) (providing empirical data indicating that former renters experience size-
able gains in housing satisfaction upon becoming homeowners).
433. Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into Fam-
ily Law, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 385, 387-92, 395-403 (2009) (analyzing
family law implications of empirical research demonstrating that close interper-
sonal relationships are significantly correlated with subjective well-being).
434. Id. at 403-10 (analyzing implications of positive psychology for laws regard-
ing parenting).
435. Nansook Park & Christopher Peterson, Does it Matter Where We Live? The
Urban Psychology of Character Strengths, 65 AM. PSYCH. 535, 538-45, fig. 1
(2010) (providing empirical data indicating how residents in 50 largest U.S.
cities differ in average scores of emotional and interpersonal character
strengths versus intellectual and self-oriented character strengths).
436. Blumenthal, supra note 169.
437. Carey K. Morewedge et al., Consuming Experience: Why Affective Forecasters
Overestimate Comparative Value, 46 J. ExP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 986, 987-91
(2010) (indicating that people overestimate how important comparative value is
when they make affective forecasts because (1) people do not realize how
much comparison requires cognitive resources; (2) experiences consume more
cognitive resources, such as people's attention, than forecasts do; and (3) any
particular experience diminishes people's ability to compare that experience to
its alternatives).
438. THE UNREAL UNIVERSE: PERCEPrION, PHYSICS, AND PHILOSOPHY, http://
theunrealuniverse.com/space-and-time (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
439. JAMES, supra note 5, at 680.
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temporal answer to whether people care more about experiences or memories
is that people care more about experiences when they experience them and
more about memories when they remember them. A temporal difference in
what people care more about could be seen as a focusing illusion: people
focus on experiences now and memories later. But is this really an illusion or
just a temporally appropriate difference in what people can, do, and should
focus their attention upon?
Many people are not often present in moments of their experiences be-
cause they are thinking about or having feelings about future or past exper-
iences. Behavioral awareness is related to mindfulness, which can be defined
simply as a non-judgmental and present-centered attention to ones emotions
and thoughts relating to ongoing life events. Psychological research finds that
increased mindfulness is associated with more positive emotions, mood regu-
lation expectancies, and self-acceptance.440 These and other self-regulatory
benefits of mindfulness that foster academic success and prosocial behavior
support conducting additional research into teaching mindfulness in Ameri-
can public education. 44
Learning to be mindfully aware of experiences as they unfold is a skill
that people can develop and practice through mindfulness meditation.442 Leo-
nard Riskin, a pioneer in advocating mindfulness meditation for the legal
profession, explains how it can help law students, lawyers, and clients to
resolve legal conflicts and disputes.443 Mindfulness and meditation also re-
duce stress, improve cognitive performance, strengthen immune function,
and provide health, neurological, and psychological benefits. 444 Recent
neuroscience research finds that mindfulness and meditation alter people's
neural function and brain structure in ways that benefit people's bodies and
440. Sherlyn S. Jimenez et al., A Mindfulness Model of Affect Regulation and De-
pressive Symptoms: Positive Emotions, Mood Regulation Expectancies, and
Self-Acceptance as Regulatory Mechanisms, 49 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 645, 646-49 (2010) (presenting details of this cross-sectional
research).
441. Mind and Life Education Network, Contemplative Practices and Mental Train-
ing: Prospects for American Education, 6 CHILD DEv. PERSP. 146 (2012).
442. Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, supra note 15, at 420-22 (analyz-
ing how and why legal policy can foster mindfulness).
443. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential
Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students and Lawyers and
Their Clients, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1-66 (2002), available at http://
westallen.typepad.com/idealawg/files/contlawhnlrpdfriskin.pdf (explaining
how mindfulness meditation can be helpful in alternative dispute resolution and
law).
444. Austin, supra note 14, at 838-43 (discussing details).
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minds.445 Practicing mindfulness can provide the awareness for lawyers to
improve their decision making and the space to exercise their options to en-
gage in ethical and professional behavior.446
Observing one's own current internal state, a facet of mindfulness, is
associated with more restrained affective forecasts in addition to reduced sus-
ceptibility to impact bias.447 Encouraging mindfulness can thus help counter-
act a common tendency people have to favor their inaccurate affective
forecasts and idiosyncratic emotional memories over their actual experiences
in making decisions. Improving people's ability to better observe current ex-
periences helps develop the understanding that emotions, both positive and
negative, are necessarily ephemeral and passing reactions that will be coun-
terbalanced by future life events.
Third parties can also pursue activities to make people's negative mem-
ories less psychologically harmful. For example, people who receive more
positive feedback about negative life experiences report feeling calmer about
such experiences in comparison to a control group. 448 Helping people view
and think about negative events less negatively can lead people to remember
such events more positively; in other words, there could be psychological
benefits to looking on the bright side.449
In conclusion, strong normative reasons that support law caring more
about people's experiences than memories include chronic health or stress
effects from repeating certain experiences. In addition, law can alter how
individuals experience their lives by facilitating and supporting mindfulness.
Finally, law can directly alter how people remember their experiences. Im-
portant open questions are whether people's experiences or memories are
more malleable and whether law can more easily and effectively alter peo-
ple's experiences or their memories.
445. Matthieu Ricard et al., Mind of the Meditator, Sci. AM., Nov. 2014, at 39 (pro-
viding details); Richard J. Davidson, William James and Vilas Professor of
Psychology and Psychiatry, Director of the Center for Investigating Healthy
Minds at the Waisman Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Well-Being
is a Skill, Community Lecture at the University of Colorado Boulder (Dec. 9,
2014), http://www.cucrest.com/events-source/davidson.
446. Peter H. Huang, How Improving Decision-Making and Mindfulness Can Im-
prove Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 21 J.L. Bus. & ETHICS 35, 68 (2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2474448.
447. Amber S. Emanuel et al., The Role of Mindfulness Facets in Affective Forecast-
ing, 49 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 815, 816-18 (2010) (testing
and confirming prediction that facets of mindfulness decrease impact bias in
affective forecasting).
448. Melanie K. T. Takarangi & Deryn Strange, Emotional Impact Feedback
Changes How We Remember Negative Autobiographical Experiences, 57 Ex-
PERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 354, 357 tbl. 2 (2010).
449. Id. at 358.
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As a way to make more memorable and summarize this article's thesis,
contemplate these five questions. How did you predict you would feel before
reading this article? How did you feel as you read this article? How do you
now remember feeling as you read it? What do you predict you will feel if
you read this article again or other similar ones in the future? How can you
improve the experiences and memories of reading this article?

